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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-16T17:07:48.569112+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-moto-cve-2026-75508</id>
    <title>BREW-moto-CVE-2026-75508 — GraphQL-core: Denial of service via comment tokens bypassing the parser's max_tokens limit</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T17:07:48.813556+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: moto</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The parser's `max_tokens` limit — the documented defence against oversized GraphQL
documents — did not count comment tokens. A document padded with comments could
therefore pass a `max_tokens` check of any size while still allocating one `Token`
object per comment, all of which stay reachable for the lifetime of the parsed
document. A 38 MB comment-padded payload allocated roughly 92 MB of additional
resident memory with `max_tokens=5` in force.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>`Lexer.lookahead()` reads tokens one at a time and skips over comments, returning only
the first non-comment token. Each skipped comment is nevertheless fully tokenized,
allocated as a `Token` object, and linked into the persistent token list via
`token.next` / `token.prev` — the chain that powers source-location reporting, and
which is retained as long as the document is.</p>
<p>`Parser.advance_lexer()` incremented the token counter only for the tokens the lexer
actually returned. Comments were therefore invisible to the accounting, and
`max_tokens` bounded only the *non-comment* tokens.</p>
<p>The practical consequence is a gap between what users reasonably believe `max_tokens`
protects and what it did protect. The limit was not broken for ordinary documents —
real tokens were still capped correctly — so the shortfall was not observable without
specifically testing comment padding.</p>
<p>As with the companion issue, the payload compresses extremely well (`# c\n` repeated),
so body-size limits and WAF inspection applied to…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-moto-cve-2026-75508"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-395103</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-395103</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T17:07:48.813647+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-395103</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-395103"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75508</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-75508</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T17:07:48.813663+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser's max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75508"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r77w-qph3-7vf8</id>
    <title>GHSA-r77w-qph3-7vf8 — GraphQL-core: Denial of service via comment tokens bypassing the parser's max_tokens limit</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T17:07:48.813690+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: graphql-core</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The parser's `max_tokens` limit — the documented defence against oversized GraphQL
documents — did not count comment tokens. A document padded with comments could
therefore pass a `max_tokens` check of any size while still allocating one `Token`
object per comment, all of which stay reachable for the lifetime of the parsed
document. A 38 MB comment-padded payload allocated roughly 92 MB of additional
resident memory with `max_tokens=5` in force.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>`Lexer.lookahead()` reads tokens one at a time and skips over comments, returning only
the first non-comment token. Each skipped comment is nevertheless fully tokenized,
allocated as a `Token` object, and linked into the persistent token list via
`token.next` / `token.prev` — the chain that powers source-location reporting, and
which is retained as long as the document is.</p>
<p>`Parser.advance_lexer()` incremented the token counter only for the tokens the lexer
actually returned. Comments were therefore invisible to the accounting, and
`max_tokens` bounded only the *non-comment* tokens.</p>
<p>The practical consequence is a gap between what users reasonably believe `max_tokens`
protects and what it did protect. The limit was not broken for ordinary documents —
real tokens were still capped correctly — so the shortfall was not observable without
specifically testing comment padding.</p>
<p>As with the companion issue, the payload compresses extremely well (`# c\n` repeated),
so body-size limits and WAF inspection applied to…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r77w-qph3-7vf8"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:95872</id>
    <title>RHSA-2026:95872 — Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 3.5.3 - Red Hat OpenShift AI</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T17:07:48.813739+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>markdown: python-markdown: Denial of Service via inefficient inline link parsing undici: undici: Information disclosure and Denial of Service via malformed Cache-Control directives @fastify/static: @fastify/static: Information disclosure via route guard bypass fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion vulnerability via backslash in URI authority undici: undici: Denial of Service via unrequested WebSocket subprotocol extract-zip: extract-zip: Arbitrary file write via symlink in archive encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal find-my-way: find-my-way: Denial of Service vulnerability in HTTP/2 server systeminformation: systeminformation: Arbitrary Command Execution via OS Command Injection mlflow: mlflow: Arbitrary file write via FileStore path traversal mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via session memory exhaustion in streamable HTTP servers nltk: NLTK: Information Disclosure via Symlink Sandbox Bypass github.com/klauspost/compress: klauspost/compress: Denial of Service via integer overflow in dictionary processing com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson-core: jackson-core: Denial of Service via excessively long JSON property names accelerate: Hugging Face Accelerate: Path Traversal and Denial of Service via weight_map brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation aiohttp: AIOHTTP: HTTP Request Smuggling via WebSocket Upgrade aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Denial of Ser…</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:95872"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-75508</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-75508</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T17:07:48.814040+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: graphql-core, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: graphql-core, Ubuntu:26.10: graphql-core, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: graphql-core</p>
<p>GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser's max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-75508"/>
  </entry>
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