<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-17T11:25:58.810956+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348603</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-348603</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T11:25:58.897018+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-348603</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348603"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70492</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-70492</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T11:25:58.897067+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.10.0 until 0.11.0, src/lib/components/chat/Messages/Markdown/KatexRenderer.svelte could store and render a chat message whose math block makes KaTeX fail with a stack overflow instead of a parse error. The catch branch fell back to inserting the original math source into the page as HTML through {@html} rather than as text, so script in the message runs in the browser of whoever views it, including shared chats and channels. The viewer's session token in localStorage can be stolen, and an administrator viewer can have their account taken over. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70492"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pwxh-7358-jq2x</id>
    <title>GHSA-pwxh-7358-jq2x — Open WebUI: Stored XSS via unescaped KaTeX render-error fallback in rendered messages</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T11:25:58.897122+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p>
<p>## Summary
Any authenticated user can store a chat message whose math block makes KaTeX fail with a stack overflow instead of a parse error. When that happens the renderer falls back to inserting the original math source into the page as HTML rather than as text, so script in the message runs in the browser of whoever views it. Every surface that renders messages is affected, including shared chats and channels, and the missing control is output escaping on the error path.</p>
<p>## Preconditions
Default configuration, no flags involved. The attacker needs a normal user account and a way to get the target to open the content: a shared chat link, a channel the target reads, or any other message surface. No admin rights and no non-default settings are required on either side.</p>
<p>## Impact
Script executes in the viewer's browser on the Open WebUI origin, which puts the session token in localStorage within reach and therefore allows taking over the viewing account. If the viewer is an administrator, that is administrator access to the instance. Exploitation needs the target to open the content, but nothing beyond that: no interaction with the message itself. Server-side data and availability are unaffected; the impact is entirely in the viewer's browser session.</p>
<p>## Fix
Fixed in 0.11.0 by commit bc600d3f0 (PR #26718). The error path now HTML-escapes the math source before it reaches the DOM, so a failed render displays the formula as text instead of as markup. Upgrading fully resolves t…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pwxh-7358-jq2x"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3650</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-3650 — Open WebUI: Stored XSS via unescaped KaTeX render-error fallback in rendered messages</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T11:25:58.897203+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p>
<p>## Summary
Any authenticated user can store a chat message whose math block makes KaTeX fail with a stack overflow instead of a parse error. When that happens the renderer falls back to inserting the original math source into the page as HTML rather than as text, so script in the message runs in the browser of whoever views it. Every surface that renders messages is affected, including shared chats and channels, and the missing control is output escaping on the error path.</p>
<p>## Preconditions
Default configuration, no flags involved. The attacker needs a normal user account and a way to get the target to open the content: a shared chat link, a channel the target reads, or any other message surface. No admin rights and no non-default settings are required on either side.</p>
<p>## Impact
Script executes in the viewer's browser on the Open WebUI origin, which puts the session token in localStorage within reach and therefore allows taking over the viewing account. If the viewer is an administrator, that is administrator access to the instance. Exploitation needs the target to open the content, but nothing beyond that: no interaction with the message itself. Server-side data and availability are unaffected; the impact is entirely in the viewer's browser session.</p>
<p>## Fix
Fixed in 0.11.0 by commit bc600d3f0 (PR #26718). The error path now HTML-escapes the math source before it reaches the DOM, so a failed render displays the formula as text instead of as markup. Upgrading fully resolves t…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3650"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
