Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5
raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header fits within the message length:
iphlen = iph->ihl * 4; err = -EINVAL; if (iphlen > length) goto error_free;
if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) { /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */ }
It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to __ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4 and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t) result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic.
An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791: "Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in 32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a packet into its own output path.
Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing "iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to.
Once this lands,…
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5
raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header fits within the message length:
iphlen = iph->ihl * 4; err = -EINVAL; if (iphlen > length) goto error_free;
if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) { /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */ }
It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to __ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4 and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t) result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic.
An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791: "Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in 32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a packet into its own output path.
Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing "iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to.
Once this lands,…
Affected: openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel
The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok()
Three architectures check the end of a user access against the address limit without taking a possible overflow into account. Passing a negative length or another overflow in here returns success when it should not.
Use the most common correct implementation here, which optimizes for a constant 'size' argument, and turns the common case into a single comparison.(CVE-2022-49289)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
parisc: Fix double SIGFPE crash
Camm noticed that on parisc a SIGFPE exception will crash an application with a second SIGFPE in the signal handler. Dave analyzed it, and it happens because glibc uses a double-word floating-point store to atomically update function descriptors. As a result of lazy binding, we hit a floating-point store in fpe_func almost immediately.
When the T bit is set, an assist exception trap occurs when when the co-processor encounters *any* floating-point instruction except for a double store of register %fr0. The latter cancels all pending traps. Let's fix this by clearing the Trap (T) bit in the FP status register before returning to the signal handler in userspace.
The issue can be reproduced with this test program:
root@parisc:~# cat fpe.c
static void fpe_func(int sig, siginfo_t *i, void *v) {…
Security update for the Linux Kernel
Security update for the Linux Kernel
Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 245 more
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5 raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header fits within the message length: iphlen = iph->ihl * 4; err = -EINVAL; if (iphlen > length) goto error_free; if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) { /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */ } It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to __ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4 and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t) result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic. An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791: "Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in 32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a packet into its own output path. Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing "iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to. Once this lands, the "if…
Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.