Affected: Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ethtool: cmis: require exact CDB reply length

Malicious SFP module could respond with rpl_len longer than what cmis_cdb_process_reply() expected, leading to OOB writes. Malicious HW is a bit theoretical but some modules may just be buggy and/or the reads may occasionally get corrupted, so let's protect the kernel.

The existing check protects from short replies. We need to protect from long ones, too. All callers that pass a non-zero rpl_exp_len cast the reply payload to a fixed-layout struct and read fields at fixed offsets, with no version negotiation or short-reply handling:

- cmis_cdb_validate_password() - cmis_cdb_module_features_get() - cmis_fw_update_fw_mng_features_get()

so let's assume that responses longer than expected do not have to be handled gracefully here. Add a warning message to make the debug easier in case my understanding is wrong...

Note that page_data->length (argument of kmalloc) comes from last arg to ethtool_cmis_page_init() which is rpl_exp_len.

Note2 that AIs also like to point out overflows in args->req.payload itself (which is a fixed-size 120 B buffer, on the stack), but callers should be reading structs defined by the standard, so protecting from requests for more data than max seem like defensive programming.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ethtool: cmis: require exact CDB reply length

Malicious SFP module could respond with rpl_len longer than what cmis_cdb_process_reply() expected, leading to OOB writes. Malicious HW is a bit theoretical but some modules may just be buggy and/or the reads may occasionally get corrupted, so let's protect the kernel.

The existing check protects from short replies. We need to protect from long ones, too. All callers that pass a non-zero rpl_exp_len cast the reply payload to a fixed-layout struct and read fields at fixed offsets, with no version negotiation or short-reply handling:

- cmis_cdb_validate_password() - cmis_cdb_module_features_get() - cmis_fw_update_fw_mng_features_get()

so let's assume that responses longer than expected do not have to be handled gracefully here. Add a warning message to make the debug easier in case my understanding is wrong...

Note that page_data->length (argument of kmalloc) comes from last arg to ethtool_cmis_page_init() which is rpl_exp_len.

Note2 that AIs also like to point out overflows in args->req.payload itself (which is a fixed-size 120 B buffer, on the stack), but callers should be reading structs defined by the standard, so protecting from requests for more data than max seem like defensive programming.

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Affected: Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 118 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: cmis: require exact CDB reply length Malicious SFP module could respond with rpl_len longer than what cmis_cdb_process_reply() expected, leading to OOB writes. Malicious HW is a bit theoretical but some modules may just be buggy and/or the reads may occasionally get corrupted, so let's protect the kernel. The existing check protects from short replies. We need to protect from long ones, too. All callers that pass a non-zero rpl_exp_len cast the reply payload to a fixed-layout struct and read fields at fixed offsets, with no version negotiation or short-reply handling: - cmis_cdb_validate_password() - cmis_cdb_module_features_get() - cmis_fw_update_fw_mng_features_get() so let's assume that responses longer than expected do not have to be handled gracefully here. Add a warning message to make the debug easier in case my understanding is wrong... Note that page_data->length (argument of kmalloc) comes from last arg to ethtool_cmis_page_init() which is rpl_exp_len. Note2 that AIs also like to point out overflows in args->req.payload itself (which is a fixed-size 120 B buffer, on the stack), but callers should be reading structs defined by the standard, so protecting from requests for more data than max seem like defensive programming.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.