Affected: CleanStart: airflow-3

Security vulnerability affects the airflow-3 package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.

joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. in versions 1.7.1 and prior, joserfc accepts JWTs with trailing padding (==) which are not conforming to the JOSE specifications. This leads to malleability of the JWTs when consumed by joserfc. Depending on this application this might or not be an issue. This could lead to bypass of token revocation or anti-replay protection when implemented as a deny list of tokens or a deny list of token hashes. Note that ECDSA JWS are always malleable because of the malleability of ECDSA signatures (first test case in the code bellow). This makes a scheme which assumes that JWTs are not malleable brittle. However for other signatures (or MAC) schemes it might make sense to assume non malleability of the token. This issue has been fixed in version 1.7.2.

python313-joserfc-1.7.4-2.1 on GA media

pyOpenSSL: DTLS cookie callback buffer overflow joserfc: joserfc: JWT Malleability via Non-Standard Padding axios: axios: Denial of Service via uncontrolled recursion in form data processing axios: axios: Outbound Request Tampering via Prototype Pollution in Basic Auth axios: axios: Information disclosure via Prototype Pollution in Node HTTP adapter axios: axios: Denial of Service via object serialization bypass nanoid: nanoid: Predictable ID generation due to integer overflow

Affected: Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: joserfc

joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. in versions 1.7.1 and prior, joserfc accepts JWTs with trailing padding (==) which are not conforming to the JOSE specifications. This leads to malleability of the JWTs when consumed by joserfc. Depending on this application this might or not be an issue. This could lead to bypass of token revocation or anti-replay protection when implemented as a deny list of tokens or a deny list of token hashes. Note that ECDSA JWS are always malleable because of the malleability of ECDSA signatures (first test case in the code bellow). This makes a scheme which assumes that JWTs are not malleable brittle. However for other signatures (or MAC) schemes it might make sense to assume non malleability of the token. This issue has been fixed in version 1.7.2.