nginx ignition is a user interface for the nginx web server. In versions 2.29.0 through 2.40.0, the gin i18n middleware in nginx-ignition's API server runs in front of every HTTP request and calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing any size or shape filter. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of `-` characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap `_` characters even though the parser's internal scanner aliases `_` to `-` before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an `Accept-Language` header built out of `_` separators burns about 2.4 seconds of server CPU on the host running nginx-ignition; ten concurrent attackers saturate a ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth. Version 2.40.1 fixes this issue.

Affected: Go: github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition

### Summary

The gin i18n middleware in nginx-ignition's API server runs in front of every HTTP request and calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing any size or shape filter. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of `-` characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap `_` characters even though the parser's internal scanner aliases `_` to `-` before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an `Accept-Language` header built out of `_` separators burns about 2.4 seconds of server CPU on the host running nginx-ignition; ten concurrent attackers saturate a ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth.

### Affected versions

`dillmann.com.br/nginx-ignition` v2.40.0 and (per code inspection of `main`) earlier 2.x versions whose `api/common/server/i18n.go` middleware routes the `Accept-Language` header through `language.ParseAcceptLanguage` without imposing its own size or character filter. Verified on:

- the official `dillmann/nginx-ignition:latest` Docker image at v2.40.0 (E2E below) - `main` at commit `faef4c99442b329cfa4ee8879bdba41c22866a18` by reading `api/common/server/i18n.go` (the middleware is unchanged)

### Privilege required

Unauthenticated. The middleware is registered on the global gin router that serves b…

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: nginx, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: nginx, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: nginx, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: nginx, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: nginx, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: nginx, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: nginx

nginx ignition is a user interface for the nginx web server. In versions 2.29.0 through 2.40.0, the gin i18n middleware in nginx-ignition's API server runs in front of every HTTP request and calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing any size or shape filter. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of `-` characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap `_` characters even though the parser's internal scanner aliases `_` to `-` before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an `Accept-Language` header built out of `_` separators burns about 2.4 seconds of server CPU on the host running nginx-ignition; ten concurrent attackers saturate a ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth. Version 2.40.1 fixes this issue.