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  <updated>2026-11-22T19:53:22.831822+00:00</updated>
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    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409011</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-409011</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T19:53:22.834255+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-409011</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409011"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59975</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-59975</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T19:53:22.834297+00:00</updated>
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        <p>SharpIppNext is a .NET Standard library for building Internet Printing Protocol clients and servers. Prior to 4.1.0, server-side SharpIppNext implementations using SharpIppServer.ReceiveRequestAsync or SharpIppServer.ReceiveRawRequestAsync pass incoming data to IppProtocol.ReadIppRequestAsync in SharpIpp/Protocol/IppProtocol.cs, where ReadDocumentStream is enabled by default and the remaining document body is copied with CopyToAsync into a MemoryStream without a size limit. An unauthenticated remote client can send an arbitrarily large IPP document body, exhausting process memory and causing an out-of-memory failure or service termination. Client-only implementations using SharpIppClient are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59975"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3h63-w8jq-rrf2</id>
    <title>GHSA-3h63-w8jq-rrf2 — SharpIppNext: Unbounded IPP Document Stream Buffering Leads to Denial of Service</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T19:53:22.834332+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> NuGet: SharpIppNext</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>SharpIppNext's `IppProtocol.ReadIppRequestAsync()` unconditionally copies the entire attacker-supplied IPP document payload into an unbounded `MemoryStream` with no size limit. Because this behavior is enabled by default (`ReadDocumentStream = true`) and the official server documentation shows `HttpContext.Request.Body` being passed directly to `ReceiveRequestAsync()` without authentication, an unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust the server process's memory by sending an arbitrarily large IPP request body, causing an Out-Of-Memory (OOM) condition and denial of service.</p>
<p>&gt; [!NOTE]
&gt; This vulnerability only affects server-side implementations (using `SharpIppServer` to parse incoming IPP requests). It does not affect client-side implementations using `SharpIppClient` or client-side request construction.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The vulnerable sink is in `SharpIpp/Protocol/IppProtocol.cs`:</p>
<p>```csharp
// IppProtocol.cs:39 — enabled by default
public bool ReadDocumentStream { get; set; } = true;</p>
<p>// IppProtocol.cs:466–470 — no size cap on the copy
if (ReadDocumentStream)
{
    message.Document = new MemoryStream();
    await reader.BaseStream.CopyToAsync(message.Document);  // unbounded
    message.Document.Seek(0, SeekOrigin.Begin);
}
```</p>
<p>The full call chain from the public API to the vulnerable sink:</p>
<p>1. `docs/Content/Server/index.md:6–11` — Official server example passes `context.Request.Body` (unauthenticated) to `sharpIppServer.ReceiveRequestAsync(inputStream)`.
2…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3h63-w8jq-rrf2"/>
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