Affected: AlmaLinux:8: fence-agents-aliyun, AlmaLinux:8: fence-agents-all, AlmaLinux:8: fence-agents-amt-ws, AlmaLinux:8: fence-agents-apc, AlmaLinux:8: fence-agents-apc-snmp, AlmaLinux:8: fence-agents-aws, AlmaLinux:8: fence-agents-azure-arm, AlmaLinux:8: fence-agents-bladecenter, AlmaLinux:8: fence-agents-brocade, AlmaLinux:8: fence-agents-cisco-mds and 38 more

The fence-agents packages provide a collection of scripts for handling remote power management for cluster devices. They allow failed or unreachable nodes to be forcibly restarted and removed from the cluster.

Security Fix(es):

* httplib2: httplib2: Denial of Service via unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies (CVE-2026-59939)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Affected: Homebrew: charmcraft

### Summary

The `httplib2` HTTP client library performs unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies encoded with `Content-Encoding: gzip` or `deflate`. A malicious or compromised HTTP server can return a small compressed payload (approximately 150 KB) that expands to an arbitrarily large size in memory (150 MB or more), causing `MemoryError` or OOM-kill in the client process. This is a classic decompression bomb (zip bomb) attack against the HTTP client.

Any application using `httplib2.Http().request()` against untrusted or attacker-controlled HTTP endpoints is affected.

### Details

**Affected code:** `httplib2/__init__.py` - `_decompressContent()` function

The decompression path has two unbounded operations:

1. **gzip decompression** (line 394): ```python content = gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=io.BytesIO(new_content)).read() ``` The `.read()` call with no size argument decompresses the entire gzip payload into a single in-memory bytes object. There is no limit on the decompressed size.

2. **deflate decompression** (line 397): ```python content = zlib.decompress(content, zlib.MAX_WBITS) ``` Similarly, `zlib.decompress()` returns the fully decompressed content as a single bytes object with no size bound.

3. **Automatic invocation** (line 1431): `_decompressContent()` is called automatically on every HTTP response that includes a `Content-Encoding: gzip` or `deflate` header. The full compressed body is already buffered in memory via `response.read(…

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: airflow-3

Package airflow-3 version 3.1.8-r6 fixes 13 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-53533, CVE-2026-59885, CVE-2026-59886, CVE-2026-59890, CVE-2026-49476...

httplib2 is a comprehensive HTTP client library for Python. Prior to 0.32.0, httplib2 performs unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies encoded with Content-Encoding: gzip or deflate in _decompressContent in httplib2/init.py, allowing a malicious or compromised HTTP server to return a small compressed payload that expands to an arbitrarily large size in memory and causes MemoryError or OOM-kill in the client process. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0.

Affected: PyPI: httplib2

### Summary

The `httplib2` HTTP client library performs unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies encoded with `Content-Encoding: gzip` or `deflate`. A malicious or compromised HTTP server can return a small compressed payload (approximately 150 KB) that expands to an arbitrarily large size in memory (150 MB or more), causing `MemoryError` or OOM-kill in the client process. This is a classic decompression bomb (zip bomb) attack against the HTTP client.

Any application using `httplib2.Http().request()` against untrusted or attacker-controlled HTTP endpoints is affected.

### Details

**Affected code:** `httplib2/__init__.py` - `_decompressContent()` function

The decompression path has two unbounded operations:

1. **gzip decompression** (line 394): ```python content = gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=io.BytesIO(new_content)).read() ``` The `.read()` call with no size argument decompresses the entire gzip payload into a single in-memory bytes object. There is no limit on the decompressed size.

2. **deflate decompression** (line 397): ```python content = zlib.decompress(content, zlib.MAX_WBITS) ``` Similarly, `zlib.decompress()` returns the fully decompressed content as a single bytes object with no size bound.

3. **Automatic invocation** (line 1431): `_decompressContent()` is called automatically on every HTTP response that includes a `Content-Encoding: gzip` or `deflate` header. The full compressed body is already buffered in memory via `response.read(…

Security update for python-httplib2

Affected: PyPI: httplib2

httplib2 is a comprehensive HTTP client library for Python. Prior to 0.32.0, httplib2 performs unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies encoded with Content-Encoding: gzip or deflate in _decompressContent in httplib2/init.py, allowing a malicious or compromised HTTP server to return a small compressed payload that expands to an arbitrarily large size in memory and causes MemoryError or OOM-kill in the client process. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0.

jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling fast-uri: fast-uri: Security policy bypass due to improper Unicode hostname canonicalization golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass python-dotenv: python-dotenv: Arbitrary file overwrite via symbolic link following mistune: Mistune: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via crafted Markdown input net: golang: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input to CookieJar.load() jupyter-server: Jupyter Server: Unauthorized File Access via Path Traversal Vulnerability net/mail: golang: Go net/mail: Denial of Service via crafted email inputs golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing jupyter-server: Jupyter Server: Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) bypass via improper Origin header validation Jupyter Notebook: JupyterLab: @jupyter-notebook/help-extension: @jupyterlab/help-extension: Jupyter Notebook and JupyterLab: Session takeover via stored cross-site scripting jupyterlab: JupyterLab: Arbitrary code execution due to improper enforcement of extension allow-list net/mail: golang: net/mail…

Affected: Rocky Linux:8: fence-agents

The fence-agents packages provide a collection of scripts for handling remote power management for cluster devices. They allow failed or unreachable nodes to be forcibly restarted and removed from the cluster.

Security Fix(es):

* httplib2: httplib2: Denial of Service via unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies (CVE-2026-59939)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Security update for python-httplib2

Affected: Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: python-httplib2, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: python-httplib2, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: python-httplib2, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: python-httplib2, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: python-httplib2, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: python-httplib2, Ubuntu:25.10: python-httplib2, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: python-httplib2

httplib2 is a comprehensive HTTP client library for Python. Prior to 0.32.0, httplib2 performs unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies encoded with Content-Encoding: gzip or deflate in _decompressContent in httplib2/init.py, allowing a malicious or compromised HTTP server to return a small compressed payload that expands to an arbitrarily large size in memory and causes MemoryError or OOM-kill in the client process. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat Enterprise Linux ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.