Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: rundeck

Package rundeck version 6.0.0-r0 fixes 52 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-42505, CVE-2026-39822, CVE-2025-67030, CVE-2026-55153, CVE-2026-34986...

mchange-commons-java is a Java library of shared utility classes used by mchange projects like the c3p0 connection pool. Prior to version 0.6.0, its JNDI ObjectFactory implementation (com.mchange.v2.naming.JavaBeanObjectFactory) will construct objects of arbitrary classes and initialize "JavaBean"-style properties, which for certain classes enables JNDI injection and "deserialization gadgets." Such initialization is unsafe for some classes: for example, setting the contentType property of a Swing JEditorPane to text/html and its text property to HTML containing a stylesheet <link> will provoke an HTTP GET on an arbitrary URL, potentially from within a trusted security domain. The problem is aggravated by the library's ReferenceIndirector, through which malicious JNDI Reference objects can be smuggled in for dereferencing wherever an application reads a Java-serialized object. This has been resolved in version 0.6.0.

Affected: Maven: com.mchange:mchange-commons-java

### Impact Prior to version 0.6.0, mchange-commons-java includes a JNDI `ObjectFactory` implementation (`com.mchange.v2.naming.JavaBeanObjectFactory`) willing to construct objects of arbitrary classes and initialize "JavaBean"-style properties. There are classes for which this kind of initialization is unsafe. For example, setting the "contentType" property of a Swing `JEditorPane` to `text/html` and the "text" property to HTML containing a stylesheet &lt;link&gt; will provoke an HTTP GET on an arbitrary URL, potentially from within a trusted security domain. This issue is aggravated by mchange-commons-java's `ReferenceIndirector`, by which malicious JNDI `Reference` objects could be smuggled in for dereferencing by applications anywhere a Java-serialized object might be read.

Prior to version 0.5.0, the same mchange-commons-java `ObjectFactory` would interpret `BinaryRefAddress` elements as Java-serialized objects, and deserialize unexpected objects that potentially execute malicious behavior on initialization. Although this author is unaware of any code within mchange-commons-java itself that can be abused to execute code on deserialization, this mechanism can be used to trigger well-known "deserialization gadget chains" involving other libraries. For example, in JVMs prior to Java 16 with Apache libraries [`commons-beanutils`](https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-beanutils/) and [`commons-collections`](https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-collections/) on the…

eclipse-vertx/vert.x: eclipse-vertx/vert.x: Denial of Service via TLS handshake with wildcard server name io.vertx/vertx-web: Eclipse Vert.x Web Client: Information disclosure via improper cookie domain validation org.apache.camel/camel-vertx-http: Apache Camel (camel-vertx-http): Remote Code Execution via Deserialization of Untrusted Data camel-jms: Apache Camel JMS components: Arbitrary Exchange state injection io.netty/netty-codec-stomp: Netty: Denial of Service vulnerability in STOMP decoder commons-configuration: Apache Commons Configuration: Denial of Service via uncontrolled recursion with crafted YAML input org.apache.camel/camel-mail: Apache Camel Mail Component: Credential exposure and information disclosure via improper input validation of mail headers org.apache.camel/camel-cxf: Apache Camel CXF SOAP: Remote attacker can execute unintended operations via header manipulation camel-vertx-websocket: Apache Camel Vertx Websocket: Server-Side Request Forgery and sensitive data exposure jackson-databind: Jackson-databind: Denial of Service via deeply nested JSON processing org.apache.httpcomponents.core5/httpcore5: Apache HttpComponents Core: Denial of Service via excessive HTTP headers org.apache.httpcomponents.core5/httpcore5-h2: Apache HttpComponents Core: Denial of Service via oversized HTTP/2 HPACK header blocks jackson-databind: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass jackson-databind: Jackson-databind: Security bypass allow…

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: c3p0, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: c3p0, Ubuntu:25.10: c3p0

mchange-commons-java is a Java library of shared utility classes used by mchange projects like the c3p0 connection pool. Prior to version 0.6.0, its JNDI ObjectFactory implementation (com.mchange.v2.naming.JavaBeanObjectFactory) will construct objects of arbitrary classes and initialize "JavaBean"-style properties, which for certain classes enables JNDI injection and "deserialization gadgets." Such initialization is unsafe for some classes: for example, setting the contentType property of a Swing JEditorPane to text/html and its text property to HTML containing a stylesheet <link> will provoke an HTTP GET on an arbitrary URL, potentially from within a trusted security domain. The problem is aggravated by the library's ReferenceIndirector, through which malicious JNDI Reference objects can be smuggled in for dereferencing wherever an application reads a Java-serialized object. This has been resolved in version 0.6.0.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM QRadar SIEM ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen und um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.