Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.65.1, the `SQLChatAgent` SQL-injection mitigation, with default `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, combines a raw-text regex blocklist (`_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`) with a `sqlglot` SELECT-only statement allowlist. The blocklist entries that target callable functions require the function name to be immediately followed by `\s*\(`. PostgreSQL accepts the same call with the name separated from `(` by a quoted identifier, an inline comment, or schema qualification. These forms evade the regex, still parse as `SELECT`, and execute the same PostgreSQL function. This restores the `pg_read_file` server-side file-read primitive that the prior CVE-2026-25879 / GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr fix was meant to block: the parent advisory fixed a missing `pg_read_file` blocklist entry, while this report shows that the added regex is bypassable. Version 0.65.1 fixes the issue.

Affected: PyPI: langroid

# SQLChatAgent `_validate_query` dangerous-pattern regex is bypassable via quoted/commented/qualified function names

## Summary

The `SQLChatAgent` SQL-injection mitigation, with default `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, combines a raw-text regex blocklist (`_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`) with a `sqlglot` SELECT-only statement allowlist. The blocklist entries that target callable functions require the function name to be immediately followed by `\s*\(`.

PostgreSQL accepts the same call with the name separated from `(` by a quoted identifier, an inline comment, or schema qualification. These forms evade the regex, still parse as `SELECT`, and execute the same PostgreSQL function. This restores the `pg_read_file` server-side file-read primitive that the prior CVE-2026-25879 / GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr fix was meant to block: the parent advisory fixed a missing `pg_read_file` blocklist entry, while this report shows that the added regex is bypassable.

## Affected Code

Tested against current `main` commit:

`6e8e7b2bb23ec04c1c25be479f16b8cc9a4f8796`

The current source still contains:

```python re.compile(r"\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE) ```

`_validate_query` checks the raw query against `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`, then parses with `sqlglot` and allows `SELECT` statements. The dangerous-call check is raw text, not normalized AST function-name matching.

## Root Cause

The current mitigation treats dangerous PostgreSQL function calls as a raw-t…

Affected: PyPI: langroid

# SQLChatAgent `_validate_query` dangerous-pattern regex is bypassable via quoted/commented/qualified function names

## Summary

The `SQLChatAgent` SQL-injection mitigation, with default `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, combines a raw-text regex blocklist (`_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`) with a `sqlglot` SELECT-only statement allowlist. The blocklist entries that target callable functions require the function name to be immediately followed by `\s*\(`.

PostgreSQL accepts the same call with the name separated from `(` by a quoted identifier, an inline comment, or schema qualification. These forms evade the regex, still parse as `SELECT`, and execute the same PostgreSQL function. This restores the `pg_read_file` server-side file-read primitive that the prior CVE-2026-25879 / GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr fix was meant to block: the parent advisory fixed a missing `pg_read_file` blocklist entry, while this report shows that the added regex is bypassable.

## Affected Code

Tested against current `main` commit:

`6e8e7b2bb23ec04c1c25be479f16b8cc9a4f8796`

The current source still contains:

```python re.compile(r"\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE) ```

`_validate_query` checks the raw query against `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`, then parses with `sqlglot` and allows `SELECT` statements. The dangerous-call check is raw text, not normalized AST function-name matching.

## Root Cause

The current mitigation treats dangerous PostgreSQL function calls as a raw-t…