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EUVD-2026-342496

2026-10-02T19:27:18.857273+00:00

EUVD-2026-342496

fkie_cve-2026-54574

2026-10-02T19:27:18.857374+00:00

proot-distro is a utility for managing proot containers. Prior to version 5.1.5, proot-distro install extracted plain tarball root filesystems through _extract_plain_tar() in proot_distro/commands/install.py and Docker layers through _apply_layer() in proot_distro/helpers/docker.py without validating archive-controlled symlink targets in member.linkname, allowing a malicious archive to plant an absolute host-path symlink and write files through it onto the host filesystem. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.5.

GHSA-9xq3-3fqg-4vg7 — `proot-distro install` has a Symlink Escape (Arbitrary Host File Write) via Malicious Tar Archive

2026-10-02T19:27:18.857450+00:00

Affected: PyPI: proot-distro

**Repository:** `termux/proot-distro` **Component:** `proot_distro/commands/install.py` → `_extract_plain_tar()`; also `helpers/docker.py` → `_apply_layer()`

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## Affected Versions

| Component | Version | |---------------|------------------------------| | proot-distro | 5.0.2 (confirmed vulnerable) | | Termux app | 0.119.0-beta.3 | | Device / ABI | Samsung Galaxy A23 / aarch64 | | Python (host) | 3.13 |

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## Vulnerability Description

`proot-distro install` extracts a plain tarball rootfs by calling `_extract_plain_tar()` in `proot_distro/commands/install.py`. This function correctly rejects tar member **names** containing `..` components, but applies **no equivalent check on symlink targets** (`member.linkname`). A tar archive can therefore:

1. Plant a symlink inside the rootfs whose target is an **absolute host path** (e.g. `/data/data/com.termux/files/home`). 2. Write a subsequent regular-file member whose path traverses through that symlink name.

Python's `open()` follows the symlink, writing the file **on the host filesystem** at the privilege level of the Termux process — entirely during `proot-distro install`, before the container is ever run.

The same `_extract_plain_tar` function is reachable via `proot-distro reset`, and the equivalent `_apply_layer` in `helpers/docker.py` contains the same flaw.

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## Vulnerable Code

**`proot_distro/commands/install.py`**, `_extract_plain_…

PYSEC-2026-3608 — `proot-distro install` has a Symlink Escape (Arbitrary Host File Write) via Malicious Tar Archive

2026-10-02T19:27:18.857624+00:00