Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.25, the Body Limit Middleware trusts the request's Content-Length header to decide whether a body is within the limit. On AWS Lambda (API Gateway v1/v2, ALB, VPC Lattice, and Lambda@Edge) the body is delivered fully buffered and the adapter builds the request with the client-declared Content-Length, which need not match the actual payload. A client can declare a tiny Content-Length while sending a much larger body, slipping past the limit. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.25.
Affected: npm: hono
### Summary
The Body Limit Middleware trusts the request's `Content-Length` header to decide whether a body is within the limit. On AWS Lambda (API Gateway v1/v2, ALB, VPC Lattice, and Lambda@Edge) the body is delivered fully buffered and the adapter builds the request with the client-declared `Content-Length`, which need not match the actual payload. A client can declare a tiny `Content-Length` while sending a much larger body, slipping past the limit.
### Details
When `Content-Length` is present and `Transfer-Encoding` is absent, the middleware compares the declared value against the limit and passes the request through if it is small enough. On standards-based runtimes the transport enforces that `Content-Length` matches the body, so this is safe. The Lambda adapters instead reconstruct the request from a buffered payload and copy the client's `Content-Length` verbatim, so the declared length and the real body size are decoupled.
This issue affects applications deployed on AWS Lambda that rely on the Body Limit Middleware to cap request body size.
### Impact
The declared body-size limit can be bypassed: a handler reads a payload larger than the configured maximum. Processing the oversized payload (large JSON, multipart, etc.) consumes additional CPU and memory per request. The payload remains bounded by the platform's request size limits, and Lambda isolates invocations, so the impact is increased per-request resource usage rather than full denial of service. This a…
Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.