Affected: Homebrew: aider

### Summary `request.form()` accepts `max_fields` and `max_part_size` to bound resource consumption while parsing form data. These limits are enforced for `multipart/form-data`, but silently ignored for `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore send a urlencoded body with an arbitrarily large number of fields or an arbitrarily large field, even when the application configured limits it believed would apply.

### Details `request.form()` dispatches to a different parser depending on the `Content-Type`. For `multipart/form-data` the `max_files`, `max_fields`, and `max_part_size` limits are forwarded to the parser, but for `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` the parser is constructed without them. It has no `max_fields` or `max_part_size` parameter to receive them, and it appends every field with no count check and accumulates each field's name and value with no size check. The configured limits are therefore both unreachable and unenforced for url-encoded bodies.

Because the url-encoded parser does its work synchronously between stream reads, the two attack shapes have different effects:

- **Field count** drives CPU and event-loop blocking. A body of ~1,000,000 fields (a sub-10MB payload such as `f0=v&f1=v&...`) blocks the worker's event loop for several seconds while parsing, during which the worker serves no other request. - **Field size** drives memory. A single large field value (e.g. a 50MB value) is buffered in full to build the `Fo…

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: litellm-database

Package litellm-database version 1.96.0-r0 fixes 5 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-54282, CVE-2025-62727, CVE-2026-48818, CVE-2026-54283, CVE-2025-54121

Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. From 0.4.1 until 1.3.1, request.form() accepts max_fields and max_part_size to bound resource consumption while parsing form data. These limits are enforced for multipart/form-data, but silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore send a urlencoded body with an arbitrarily large number of fields or an arbitrarily large field, even when the application configured limits it believed would apply. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.1.

Affected: PyPI: starlette

### Summary `request.form()` accepts `max_fields` and `max_part_size` to bound resource consumption while parsing form data. These limits are enforced for `multipart/form-data`, but silently ignored for `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore send a urlencoded body with an arbitrarily large number of fields or an arbitrarily large field, even when the application configured limits it believed would apply.

### Details `request.form()` dispatches to a different parser depending on the `Content-Type`. For `multipart/form-data` the `max_files`, `max_fields`, and `max_part_size` limits are forwarded to the parser, but for `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` the parser is constructed without them. It has no `max_fields` or `max_part_size` parameter to receive them, and it appends every field with no count check and accumulates each field's name and value with no size check. The configured limits are therefore both unreachable and unenforced for url-encoded bodies.

Because the url-encoded parser does its work synchronously between stream reads, the two attack shapes have different effects:

- **Field count** drives CPU and event-loop blocking. A body of ~1,000,000 fields (a sub-10MB payload such as `f0=v&f1=v&...`) blocks the worker's event loop for several seconds while parsing, during which the worker serves no other request. - **Field size** drives memory. A single large field value (e.g. a 50MB value) is buffered in full to build the `Fo…

Security update for python-starlette

Affected: PyPI: starlette

Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. From 0.4.1 until 1.3.1, request.form() accepts max_fields and max_part_size to bound resource consumption while parsing form data. These limits are enforced for multipart/form-data, but silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore send a urlencoded body with an arbitrarily large number of fields or an arbitrarily large field, even when the application configured limits it believed would apply. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.1.

giflib: giflib: Denial of Service via buffer overflow in EGifGCBToExtension gnutls: GnuTLS: Denial of Service via DTLS zero-length fragment gnutls: GnuTLS: Denial of Service via heap buffer overflow in DTLS handshake fragment reassembly vLLM: vLLM: Denial of Service due to excessive video frame processing vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via excessively large 'n' parameter in OpenAI-compatible API vim: arbitrary command execution via modeline sandbox bypass vllm: vLLM: Arbitrary code execution via malicious HuggingFace model gnutls: gnutls: Denial of Service via DTLS packet reordering vulnerability gnutls: gnutls: Authentication Bypass via NUL Character in Username vllm: starlette: vLLM: Critical authentication bypass allows unauthorized API access vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service due to improper floating-point validation starlette: Starlette: request.form() limits silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded enable DoS

Security update for python-starlette

Affected: Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: starlette, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: starlette, Ubuntu:25.10: starlette, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: starlette

Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. From 0.4.1 until 1.3.1, request.form() accepts max_fields and max_part_size to bound resource consumption while parsing form data. These limits are enforced for multipart/form-data, but silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore send a urlencoded body with an arbitrarily large number of fields or an arbitrarily large field, even when the application configured limits it believed would apply. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.1.