https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-05T08:46:53.780632+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330127 EUVD-2026-330127 2026-10-05T08:46:53.782351+00:00 EUVD-2026-330127 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54066 fkie_cve-2026-54066 2026-10-05T08:46:53.782379+00:00

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, the patch for CVE-2026-41894 ("Path Traversal via Double URL Encoding") sanitized the /export/ route but the identical root cause remains in the /assets/*path route. In publish mode (anonymous read-only HTTP endpoint, default port 6808), an unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary files inside WorkspaceDir — including conf/conf.json (which contains the AccessAuthCode SHA256 hash, API token, and sync keys), temp/siyuan.db, temp/blocktree.db, and siyuan.log — by double-URL-encoding .. segments. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p4m3-mgmm-c664 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664 — SiYuan: Path Traversal via Double URL Encoding in /assets/*path (publish mode arbitrary file─read), Incomplete fix of… 2026-10-05T08:46:53.782415+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

## Summary The patch for CVE-2026-41894 ("Path Traversal via Double URL Encoding") sanitized the `/export/` route but the **identical root cause remains in the `/assets/*path` route**. In publish mode (anonymous read-only HTTP endpoint, default port 6808), an unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary files inside `WorkspaceDir` — including `conf/conf.json` (which contains the `AccessAuthCode` SHA256 hash, API token, and sync keys), `temp/siyuan.db`, `temp/blocktree.db`, and `siyuan.log` — by double-URL-encoding `..` segments.

Verified against siyuan v3.6.5: - `GET /assets/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/conf/conf.json` → **HTTP 200, 10349 bytes (conf.json served)** - `GET /export/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/conf/conf.json` → HTTP 401 (patched) - `GET /assets/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json` → HTTP 404 (single-decode handled correctly)

## Vulnerable Code

**Step 1 — route & first decode** (`kernel/server/serve.go:587-626`): The router registers `GET /assets/*path` for the publish listener. Gin performs one URL decoding pass on `URL.Path`, so a request for `/assets/%252e%252e/...` yields `context.Param("path") == "/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json"` — literal `%2e%2e` strings, which `path.Clean` cannot collapse.

**Step 2 — second decode via fallback** (`kernel/model/assets.go:536-563`, `GetAssetAbsPath`): ```go p, err := getAssetAbsPath(relativePath) if nil != err { // fallback decoded, e := url.PathUnescape(relativePath) // ← line 548, second d…