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  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-17T22:42:30.477042+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329845</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-329845</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T22:42:30.479710+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-329845</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329845"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54009</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-54009</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T22:42:30.479744+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, POST /api/chat/completions accepts an image_url.url value that, when it does NOT start with http://, https://, or data:image/, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. an authenticated user can therefore set image_url.url to another user's file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. the user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54009"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wch8-mhj5-9frg</id>
    <title>GHSA-wch8-mhj5-9frg — Open WebUI: Cross-user file disclosure via /api/chat/completions image_url field</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T22:42:30.479779+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p>
<p>## summary</p>
<p>`POST /api/chat/completions` accepts an `image_url.url` value that, when it does NOT start with `http://`, `https://`, or `data:image/`, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set `image_url.url` to another user's file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back.</p>
<p>Same class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple `has_access_to_file` checks added in `routers/files.py` -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path.</p>
<p>## affected code</p>
<p>`backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150` -- `convert_url_images_to_base64`:</p>
<p>```python
async def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data):
    messages = form_data.get('messages', [])
    for message in messages:
        content = message.get('content')
        if not isinstance(content, list):
            continue
        new_content = []
        for item in content:
            if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get('type') != 'image_url':
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            image_url = item.get('image_url', {}).get('url', '')
            if image_url.startswith('data:image/'):
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            try:
                base64_da…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wch8-mhj5-9frg"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2766</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2766 — Open WebUI: Cross-user file disclosure via /api/chat/completions image_url field</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T22:42:30.479842+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p>
<p>## summary</p>
<p>`POST /api/chat/completions` accepts an `image_url.url` value that, when it does NOT start with `http://`, `https://`, or `data:image/`, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set `image_url.url` to another user's file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back.</p>
<p>Same class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple `has_access_to_file` checks added in `routers/files.py` -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path.</p>
<p>## affected code</p>
<p>`backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150` -- `convert_url_images_to_base64`:</p>
<p>```python
async def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data):
    messages = form_data.get('messages', [])
    for message in messages:
        content = message.get('content')
        if not isinstance(content, list):
            continue
        new_content = []
        for item in content:
            if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get('type') != 'image_url':
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            image_url = item.get('image_url', {}).get('url', '')
            if image_url.startswith('data:image/'):
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            try:
                base64_da…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2766"/>
  </entry>
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