Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

### Summary

Zalo allowFrom could bind to mutable display names. In affected versions, a Zalo friend or contact with mutable display metadata could match a policy entry through mutable display metadata.

This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.

### Impact

When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive agent responses intended for another Zalo identity. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.

### Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is `2026.5.3`.

### Mitigations

use stable Zalo identifiers where available and keep friend access restricted until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

OpenClaw before 2026.5.3 contains a policy enforcement vulnerability where Zalo contacts with mutable display metadata could match allowFrom policy entries through display name changes. Attackers with mutable display names could receive agent responses intended for different Zalo identities when the feature is enabled.

Affected: npm: openclaw

### Summary

Zalo allowFrom could bind to mutable display names. In affected versions, a Zalo friend or contact with mutable display metadata could match a policy entry through mutable display metadata.

This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.

### Impact

When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive agent responses intended for another Zalo identity. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.

### Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is `2026.5.3`.

### Mitigations

use stable Zalo identifiers where available and keep friend access restricted until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmechanismen zu umgehen, erhöhte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, Informationen offenzulegen, Konfigurationen zu manipulieren, beliebige Befehle oder Code auszuführen sowie interne Systeme über SSRF anzugreifen.