https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-03T09:47:15.316905+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-fy77467 CLEANSTART-2026-FY77467 — Security fix for CVE-2026-53716 applied in: tigera-operator 1.39.3-r1, tigera-operator-fips 1.37.2-r4, tigera-operator-… 2026-10-03T09:47:15.383837+00:00

Affected: CleanStart: tigera-operator, CleanStart: tigera-operator-fips

CVE-2026-53716 affects multiple packages. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-369712 EUVD-2026-369712 2026-10-03T09:47:15.383900+00:00 EUVD-2026-369712 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53716 fkie_cve-2026-53716 2026-10-03T09:47:15.383917+00:00

Envoy Gateway is an open source project for managing Envoy Proxy as a standalone or Kubernetes-based application gateway. Prior to 1.7.4 and 1.8.1, getFileFromGZ in internal/wasm/httpfetcher.go calls io.ReadAll on a gzip.Reader without limiting decompressed output when a tenant-controlled EnvoyExtensionPolicy.spec.wasm[].code.http.url points to a reachable compressed Wasm payload. The 256 MiB compressed-input cap does not constrain the expanded size, no operator Wasm URL allowlist exists, and the optional sha256 check occurs only after decompression, so a comparatively small gzip stream can force a multi-gigabyte allocation in the shared controller. The resulting out-of-memory termination restarts the controller, re-reconciles the persistent custom resource, and can create a persistent cross-tenant control-plane outage. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.4 and 1.8.1.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 — Envoy Gateway: Wasm HTTP fetch decompresses gzip without output-size limit 2026-10-03T09:47:15.383946+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/envoyproxy/gateway

Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete.

**Preconditions (4):** - Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline) - Attacker hosts a gzip-bomb at a reachable URL - sha256 unset (optional field; check is post-decompression anyway) - No operator Wasm-URL allowlist (none exists in code)

**Description**

getFileFromGZ calls io.ReadAll on a raw gzip.Reader (httpfetcher.go:216) with no output bound, while the compressed input is capped at 256 MiB (httpfetcher.go:139). The bytes originate from a tenant-controlled EnvoyExtensionPolicy.spec.wasm[].code.http.url (envoyextensionpolicy.go:1077 → cache.go:248 → httpfetcher.go:147 → :233), so an untrusted tenant can point at a ~10 MiB gzip-of-zeros and force ~10 GiB allocation in the shared controller process. All candidate guards execute either before the body is buffered or after decompression. OOM-kills, restarts, re-reconciles same CR, crash-loops — persistent cross-tenant control-plane outage with PR:L/AC:L and scope change → HIGH despite availability-only.