https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-06T21:15:23.111534+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-airshare-cve-2026-48045 BREW-airshare-CVE-2026-48045 — python-zeroconf: Unbounded TC-deferred queue allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via spoofed-source flood 2026-10-06T21:15:23.123252+00:00

Affected: Homebrew: airshare

### Impact

`AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival.

Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks).

### Patches

Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `>= 0.149.12`.

### Workarounds

There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, g…

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338586 EUVD-2026-338586 2026-10-06T21:15:23.123336+00:00 EUVD-2026-338586 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48045 fkie_cve-2026-48045 2026-10-06T21:15:23.123354+00:00

Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.12, AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer retained every truncated TC-bit incoming query, each up to _MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966 bytes, in self._deferred[addr] and armed a per-address timer in self._timers[addr] without capping the per-address list or distinct addr keys, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to spoof sources, grow _deferred and _timers, and cause memory exhaustion and quadratic CPU burn. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.12.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9663-mqmp-p9mm GHSA-9663-mqmp-p9mm — python-zeroconf: Unbounded TC-deferred queue allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via spoofed-source flood 2026-10-06T21:15:23.123380+00:00

Affected: PyPI: zeroconf

### Impact

`AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival.

Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks).

### Patches

Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `>= 0.149.12`.

### Workarounds

There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, g…

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3292 OESA-2026-3292 — python-zeroconf security update 2026-10-06T21:15:23.123420+00:00

Affected: openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3: python-zeroconf

Pure Python Multicast DNS Service Discovery Library (Bonjour/Avahi compatible) Security Fix(es):

Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.5, DNSIncoming._decode_labels_at_offset recurses once per DNS-name compression pointer, and a single mDNS packet carrying chained pointers can trigger a RecursionError that escapes DNSIncoming.__init__, causing sustained CPU burn, log flooding, and degraded mDNS-dependent features for unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb). This issue is fixed in version 0.149.5.(CVE-2026-47180)

Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.6, DNSIncoming._log_exception_debug and the four QuietLogger exception-dedup methods stored an unbounded _seen_logs dictionary keyed by attacker-influenced IncomingDecodeError messages, retaining sys.exc_info() tracebacks whose frame locals kept raw packet self.data buffers and allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to drive memory growth until mDNS-dependent features degrade or the process is OOM-killed. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.6.(CVE-2026-47183)

Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.7, DNSCache._async_add inserted every response record into cache, _expirations, _expire_heap, and service_cache without a cap, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP…

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21175-1 openSUSE-SU-2026:21175-1 — Security update for python-zeroconf 2026-10-06T21:15:23.123458+00:00

Security update for python-zeroconf

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3435 PYSEC-2026-3435 — python-zeroconf: Unbounded TC-deferred queue allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via spoofed-source flood 2026-10-06T21:15:23.123477+00:00

Affected: PyPI: zeroconf

### Impact

`AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival.

Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks).

### Patches

Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `>= 0.149.12`.

### Workarounds

There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, g…

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-48045 UBUNTU-CVE-2026-48045 2026-10-06T21:15:23.123515+00:00

Affected: Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: python-zeroconf, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: python-zeroconf, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: python-zeroconf, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: python-zeroconf, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: python-zeroconf, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: python-zeroconf

Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.12, AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer retained every truncated TC-bit incoming query, each up to _MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966 bytes, in self._deferred[addr] and armed a per-address timer in self._timers[addr] without capping the per-address list or distinct addr keys, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to spoof sources, grow _deferred and _timers, and cause memory exhaustion and quadratic CPU burn. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.12.