Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: keycloak

Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the keycloak package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record's name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain's key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain's key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Affected: Maven: io.netty:netty-resolver-dns

### Summary Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`).

### Details In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record's name is a suffix of the questionName.

This means if the resolver queries evil.co.uk., it will accept an NS record claiming authority over co.uk.. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain's key (co.uk.). This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under co.uk..

The `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#cache` method only prevents caching if the record is for the root zone (dots == 1).

### Impact DNS Cache Poisoning. Any application using Netty's DNS resolver is impacted.

netty-4.1.135-1.1 on GA media

eclipse-vertx/vert.x: eclipse-vertx/vert.x: Denial of Service via TLS handshake with wildcard server name netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation netty-codec-haproxy: Netty-codec-haproxy: Denial of Service via malformed HAProxy message netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake netty-resolver-dns: Netty DNS resolver: DNS Cache Poisoning via predictable transaction IDs netty-resolver-dns: Netty: Information disclosure and data manipulation due to improper CNAME record validation netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via uncontrolled HTTP/2 concurrent streams io.netty/netty-resolver-dns: Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records netty-codec-http2: netty-codec-http2: Denial of Service due to resource leak netty-codec-haproxy: Netty HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec: Denial of Service via memory leak from crafted PROXY protocol headers netty-handler: Netty: Improper trust manager handling leads to hostname verification bypass netty-codec-http: Netty: Data manipulation via request-boundary confusion in HttpObjectDecoder io.quarkus/quarkus-vertx-http: Quarkus: Authorization bypass in HTTP path-based policies via encoded characters netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service due to HTTP/2 max header size handling

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: netty, Ubuntu:25.10: netty, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: netty

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record's name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain's key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain's key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.