PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no "cannot remove last owner" guard. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

Affected: PyPI: praisonai-platform

## Summary

**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no "cannot remove last owner" guard. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140; `services/member_service.py`, lines 71-78. **Root cause:** `MemberService.remove(workspace_id, user_id)` performs the deletion without any caller-permission check or owner-protection logic. The route accepts the URL-supplied `user_id` and dispatches it straight through. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is implemented but never invoked here. A member-tier attacker can issue `DELETE .../members/<owner_user_id>` and immediately lock the legitimate owner out of the workspace.

## Affected Code

**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140.

```python @router.delete("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT) async def remove_member( workspace_id: str, user_id: str, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # <-- BUG: defaults to min_role="member" session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): member_svc = MemberService(session) removed = await membe…

Affected: PyPI: praisonai-platform

## Summary

**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no "cannot remove last owner" guard. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140; `services/member_service.py`, lines 71-78. **Root cause:** `MemberService.remove(workspace_id, user_id)` performs the deletion without any caller-permission check or owner-protection logic. The route accepts the URL-supplied `user_id` and dispatches it straight through. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is implemented but never invoked here. A member-tier attacker can issue `DELETE .../members/<owner_user_id>` and immediately lock the legitimate owner out of the workspace.

## Affected Code

**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140.

```python @router.delete("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT) async def remove_member( workspace_id: str, user_id: str, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # <-- BUG: defaults to min_role="member" session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): member_svc = MemberService(session) removed = await membe…