Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: apache-nifi

Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the apache-nifi package. yawkat LZ4 Java provides LZ4 compression for Java. See references for individual vulnerability details.

ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy

Assessment: Fully addressed.

When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list .

ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes

Assessment: Fully addressed.

For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers

Both issues have been fixed.

Affected: Maven: org.apache.mina:mina-core

ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy

Assessment: Fully addressed.

When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list .

ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes

Assessment: Fully addressed.

For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers

Both issues have been fixed.

jose4j: jose4j: Denial of Service via malicious JSON Web Encryption (JWE) token compression bouncycastle: BC-JAVA: GOSTCTR implementation unable to process more than 255 blocks correctly org.codehaus.plexus:plexus-utils: Plexus-utils: Directory Traversal in extractFile method bouncycastle: BC-JAVA: LDAP injection vulnerability in LDAPStoreHelper.java org.eclipse.jetty/jetty-server: Eclipse Jetty: Denial of Service due to unreleased JDK Inflater from compressed HTTP requests org.eclipse.jetty/jetty-http: HTTP request smuggling via chunked extension quoted-string parsing bouncycastle: BC-JAVA: unbounded PGP AEAD chunk size leads to pre-auth resource exhaustion bouncycastle: BC-JAVA: PKIX draft CompositeVerifier accepts empty signature sequence as valid httpclient: Apache HttpClient: Authentication bypass due to missing mutual authentication verification Apache MINA: Apache MINA: Arbitrary code execution via incomplete deserialization fix Apache MINA: Apache MINA: Arbitrary code execution via classname allowlist bypass Apache MINA: deserialization of untrusted data (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-41409) Apache MINA: Apache MINA: Arbitrary Code Execution via Classname Allowlist Bypass mina: mina: Arbitrary Code Execution via Deserialization Bypass jackson-databind: Jackson-databind: Denial of Service via deeply nested JSON processing jenkins: Jenkins: Arbitrary code execution via deserialization of attacker-controlled configuration jenkins: Jenkins: Phishing attack via improper red…

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: mina2, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: mina2, Ubuntu:25.10: mina2, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: mina2

ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM Operational Decision Manager ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsbeschränkungen zu umgehen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen und Code auszuführen.