Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: opensearch-dashboards-fips

Package opensearch-dashboards-fips version 3.6.0-r4 fixes 7 vulnerabilities: ghsa-cmwh-pvxp-8882, CVE-2026-12143, CVE-2026-46625, CVE-2026-53550, CVE-2026-53655...

JavaScript Cookie is a JavaScript API for handling cookies, client-side. Prior to version 3.0.7, js-cookie's internal assign() helper copies properties with for...in + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by JSON.parse, the JSON object's "__proto__" member is an own enumerable property, so the for…in enumerates it and the target[key] = source[key] write triggers the Object.prototype.__proto__ setter on the fresh target ({}). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: Object.prototype itself is untouched, but the merged attributes object now inherits attacker-controlled keys. Because the consuming set() function then enumerates the merged object with another for...in, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting Set-Cookie string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set domain=, secure=, samesite=, expires=, and path= on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down. This issue has been patched in version 3.0.7.

Affected: npm: js-cookie

## Summary

`js-cookie`'s internal `assign()` helper copies properties with `for...in` + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by `JSON.parse`, the JSON object's `"__proto__"` member is an *own enumerable* property, so the `for…in` enumerates it and the `target[key] = source[key]` write triggers the **`Object.prototype.__proto__` setter** on the fresh `target` (`{}`). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: `Object.prototype` itself is untouched, but the merged `attributes` object now inherits attacker-controlled keys.

Because the consuming `set()` function then enumerates the merged object with another `for...in`, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting `Set-Cookie` string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set `domain=`, `secure=`, `samesite=`, `expires=`, and `path=` on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down.

## Impact

Any application that forwards a JSON-derived object as the `attributes` argument to `Cookies.set`, `Cookies.remove`, `Cookies.withAttributes`, or `Cookies.withConverter` is vulnerable. This is the standard pattern when cookie configuration comes from a backend:

```js const cfg = await fetch('/config').then(r => r.json()); Cookies.set('session', token, cfg.cookieAttrs); // cfg.cookieAttrs influenced by attacker ```

A payload of `{"__proto__":{"domain":"evil.example","secure":"false","samesite":"None"}}` causes js-cookie to emit:

``` Set-Cookie: session=TOKEN; pa…

form-data: form-data: Form field override via CRLF injection golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing ip-address: ip-address: Cross-site scripting via improper HTML escaping of untrusted input axios: Axios: Information disclosure of proxy credentials via HTTP redirects axios: Axios: Information disclosure of proxy credentials via redirect flows axios: Axios: Denial of Service due to unenforced request and response size limits axios: Axios: Proxy bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 address non-normalization axios: Axios: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack via Prototype Pollution axios: Axios: Information disclosure due to prototype pollution vulnerability axios: Axios: Client-side Denial of Service via unescaped regex metacharacters in XSRF cookie name js-cookie: JavaScript Cookie: Cookie attribute manipulation via prototype pollution ws: ws: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion from small WebSocket fragments

Affected: Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: node-js-cookie, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-js-cookie, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-js-cookie, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-js-cookie, Ubuntu:25.10: node-js-cookie, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-js-cookie

JavaScript Cookie is a JavaScript API for handling cookies, client-side. Prior to version 3.0.7, js-cookie's internal assign() helper copies properties with for...in + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by JSON.parse, the JSON object's "__proto__" member is an own enumerable property, so the for…in enumerates it and the target[key] = source[key] write triggers the Object.prototype.__proto__ setter on the fresh target ({}). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: Object.prototype itself is untouched, but the merged attributes object now inherits attacker-controlled keys. Because the consuming set() function then enumerates the merged object with another for...in, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting Set-Cookie string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set domain=, secure=, samesite=, expires=, and path= on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down. This issue has been patched in version 3.0.7.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in HCL BigFix ausnutzen, um Daten zu manipulieren.