Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, evaluation create and update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace evaluation takeover. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.

Affected: npm: flowise

## Summary

**Type:** Mass assignment via `Object.assign(entity, body)` -> client-controlled `workspaceId` (and on create, `id`) overwritten on the Evaluation entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR. **File:** `packages/server/src/services/evaluations/index.ts` **Root cause:** The Evaluation controller/service constructs a `new Evaluation()` and copies the request body into it via `Object.assign(...)` without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include `workspaceId`, `id`, `createdDate`, `updatedDate`. The server only rebinds *some* of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites `workspaceId` but not `id`; on update, it overwrites `id` but not `workspaceId`). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the evaluation entity's sibling controllers and as `DocumentStore` before it was patched in commit 840d2ae.

## Affected Code

**File:** `packages/server/src/services/evaluations/index.ts`

```ts // at line 69 Object.assign(newEvaluation, body) // <-- BUG: body.id, body.workspaceId, body.createdDate, body.updatedDate accepted ```

**Why it's wrong:** `Object.assign(target, source)` copies every own enumerable property of `source` onto `target`. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so `workspaceId` set in the request body lands as the new `workspaceId` of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (comm…

Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Flowise ausnutzen, um Code auszuführen, Objekte anderer Benutzer zu übernehmen, Informationen offenzulegen und weitere, nicht näher genannte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.