Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, when credentials are fetched with a credentialName filter parameter, the encryptedData field is not stripped from the response. The code properly omits encryptedData when no filter is used but fails to do so when a filter is used. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.

Affected: npm: flowise

**Severity**: HIGH (CVSS ~7.5) **Type**: CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information) **File**: `packages/server/src/services/credentials/index.ts:62-71`

**Description**: When credentials are fetched with a `credentialName` filter parameter, the `encryptedData` field is NOT stripped from the response. The code properly omits `encryptedData` when NO filter is used (line 102) but fails to do so when a filter IS used (lines 62-63, 70-71). Credential Data Leak **Evidence**: ```typescript // Lines 62-63: WITH filter - encryptedData LEAKED const credentials = await appServer.AppDataSource.getRepository(Credential).findBy(searchOptions) dbResponse.push(...credentials) // encryptedData NOT removed!

// Lines 100-102: WITHOUT filter - encryptedData properly omitted for (const credential of credentials) { dbResponse.push(omit(credential, ['encryptedData'])) // Correctly omitted } ```

**Impact**: Authenticated users can extract encrypted credential data (API keys, passwords, tokens for services like OpenAI, AWS, etc.). Combined with access to the encryption key file (`~/.flowise/encryption.key` written with default permissions), this enables full credential theft.

**Reproduction**: ```bash curl https://TARGET/api/v1/credentials?credentialName=openAIApi \ -H "Authorization: Bearer API_KEY" # Response includes encryptedData field with AES-encrypted credentials ```

Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Flowise ausnutzen, um Code auszuführen, Objekte anderer Benutzer zu übernehmen, Informationen offenzulegen und weitere, nicht näher genannte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.