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EUVD-2026-309295

2026-10-06T11:34:43.469443+00:00

EUVD-2026-309295

fkie_cve-2026-44340

2026-10-06T11:34:43.469492+00:00

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.37, the _safe_extractall helper that all recipe pull, recipe publish, and recipe unpack flows route through validates each archive member's name for absolute paths, .. segments, and resolved-path escape — but does not validate member.linkname, does not reject symlink/hardlink members, and calls tar.extractall(dest_dir) without filter="data". A bundle that contains a symlink with a name inside dest_dir but a linkname pointing outside it, followed by a regular file whose path traverses through the just-created symlink, escapes dest_dir and lets the attacker write arbitrary content to an attacker-chosen location on the victim's filesystem. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.37.

GHSA-9q28-ghcr-c4x3 — PraisonAI's symlink-extraction bypass of `_safe_extractall` writes outside `dest_dir`

2026-10-06T11:34:43.469535+00:00

Affected: PyPI: PraisonAI

### Summary The `_safe_extractall` helper that all `recipe pull`, `recipe publish`, and `recipe unpack` flows route through validates each archive member's `name` for absolute paths, `..` segments, and resolved-path escape — but does **not** validate `member.linkname`, does not reject symlink/hardlink members, and calls `tar.extractall(dest_dir)` without `filter="data"`. A bundle that contains a symlink with a name inside `dest_dir` but a `linkname` pointing outside it, followed by a regular file whose path traverses *through* the just-created symlink, escapes `dest_dir` and lets the attacker write arbitrary content to an attacker-chosen location on the victim's filesystem.

## Affected paths

Every code path that calls `_safe_extractall` is exposed:

| Caller | File:line | |---|---| | `praisonai recipe unpack` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py:1175` (introduced as the fix for GHSA-99g3-w8gr-x37c) | | `LocalRegistry.unpack` (recipe pull) | `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:413` | | Registry archive validation (publish) | `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:808` |

## Root cause

`recipe/registry.py:131-178`:

```python def _safe_extractall(tar: tarfile.TarFile, dest_dir: Path) -> None: ... for member in tar.getmembers(): ... member_path = Path(member.name) if member_path.is_absolute(): raise RegistryError(...) if '..' in member_path.parts: raise RegistryError(...) resolved = (dest_resolved / me…

PYSEC-2026-2909 — PraisonAI's symlink-extraction bypass of `_safe_extractall` writes outside `dest_dir`

2026-10-06T11:34:43.469604+00:00

Affected: PyPI: praisonai

## Affected paths

Every code path that calls `_safe_extractall` is exposed:

## Root cause

`recipe/registry.py:131-178`: