Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component.

The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast's JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel's default configuration. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are o…

Affected: Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-hazelcast

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component.

The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast's JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel's default configuration. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are o…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.