Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

## Summary

OpenClaw's exec script preflight validator previously validated and then read a script by mutable pathname. A local race could swap the path between validation and read, causing preflight analysis to inspect a different file identity than the one that passed the workspace boundary check.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` - Ecosystem: npm - Affected versions: `< 2026.4.10` - Patched versions: `>= 2026.4.10`

## Impact

The impact is limited. This was not arbitrary full-file disclosure through the preflight error path. The validator only surfaced derived preflight content, such as a matched token, a line number, or the first non-empty JavaScript line in one branch. Exploitation also required the ability to mutate the relevant workspace path during the preflight window.

Still, this was a real TOCTOU boundary bug in code that is supposed to reason about workspace-local script files before execution. A file identity that passed the initial boundary validation could differ from the identity that was later read for preflight analysis.

## Technical Details

The vulnerable flow performed separate path validation and file reads in `validateScriptFileForShellBleed`. Because the read was path-based, an attacker with write access to the workspace path could race replacement of the target after validation but before preflight read.

## Fix

PR #62333 replaced the check-then-read flow with a pinned safe-open/read path using the shared `readFileWithinRoot…

OpenClaw before 2026.4.10 contains a time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerability in the validateScriptFileForShellBleed function that allows local attackers to bypass workspace boundary checks. An attacker with workspace write access can race-condition swap the target file between validation and preflight read, causing the validator to inspect a different file identity than the one that passed the initial boundary check.

Affected: npm: openclaw

## Summary

OpenClaw's exec script preflight validator previously validated and then read a script by mutable pathname. A local race could swap the path between validation and read, causing preflight analysis to inspect a different file identity than the one that passed the workspace boundary check.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` - Ecosystem: npm - Affected versions: `< 2026.4.10` - Patched versions: `>= 2026.4.10`

## Impact

The impact is limited. This was not arbitrary full-file disclosure through the preflight error path. The validator only surfaced derived preflight content, such as a matched token, a line number, or the first non-empty JavaScript line in one branch. Exploitation also required the ability to mutate the relevant workspace path during the preflight window.

Still, this was a real TOCTOU boundary bug in code that is supposed to reason about workspace-local script files before execution. A file identity that passed the initial boundary validation could differ from the identity that was later read for preflight analysis.

## Technical Details

The vulnerable flow performed separate path validation and file reads in `validateScriptFileForShellBleed`. Because the read was path-based, an attacker with write access to the workspace path could race replacement of the target after validation but before preflight read.

## Fix

PR #62333 replaced the check-then-read flow with a pinned safe-open/read path using the shared `readFileWithinRoot…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um erweiterte Rechte zu erlangen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten offenzulegen oder zu manipulieren oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.