Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read

When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count).

This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from freed memory.

In the syzbot report: - i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB) - Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes - A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds - This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()

Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from operating on invalid data.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read

When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count).

This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from freed memory.

In the syzbot report: - i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB) - Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes - A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds - This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()

Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from operating on invalid data.

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 232 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count). This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from freed memory. In the syzbot report: - i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB) - Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes - A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds - This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry() Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from operating on invalid data.

Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen, Informationen offenzulegen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen oder potentiell beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen.