Affected: Homebrew: breezy

## Summary

Dulwich's `ProcessMergeDriver` substitutes the file path (from the git tree, controllable by an attacker via a malicious branch) into the merge driver command via the `%P` placeholder and executes it with `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)`. An attacker who can cause a victim to merge an untrusted branch can achieve arbitrary command execution by crafting malicious file paths.

## Description

- **Type:** Command Injection - **Source:** `merge.py` line 195 — path from merge tree (from repository content when merging untrusted branch) - **Sink:** `merge_drivers.py` lines 124–127 — `subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)` where `cmd` includes path via `%P` placeholder - **Impact:** Arbitrary code execution when merging from a malicious repository. Requires the user to have a merge driver configured that uses the `%P` placeholder.

## Resources

- Repository: https://github.com/dulwich/dulwich - Vulnerable file: `dulwich/merge_drivers.py` (lines 119–129)

## Proof of Concept

```python from dulwich.attrs import GitAttributes, Pattern from dulwich.config import ConfigDict from dulwich.merge import merge_blobs from dulwich.objects import Blob

# Merge driver with %P (path) - typical for custom merge tools config = ConfigDict() config.set((b"merge", b"injectable"), b"driver", b"echo %P > %A")

patterns = [(Pattern(b"*"), {b"merge": b"injectable"})] gitattributes = GitAttributes(patterns)

base = Blob.from_string(b"base") ours = Blob.from_string(b"ours") theirs = Blob.from_strin…

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: kserve-storage-controller

Package kserve-storage-controller version 0.19.0-r0 fixes 91 vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-12254, CVE-2024-12718, CVE-2024-6232, CVE-2024-7592, CVE-2024-9287...

Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.24.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, Dulwich's `ProcessMergeDriver` substitutes the file path (from the git tree, controllable by an attacker via a malicious branch) into the merge driver command via the `%P` placeholder and executes it with `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)`. An attacker who can cause a victim to merge an untrusted branch can achieve arbitrary command execution by crafting malicious file paths. Version 1.2.5 fixes the issue.

Affected: PyPI: dulwich

## Summary

Dulwich's `ProcessMergeDriver` substitutes the file path (from the git tree, controllable by an attacker via a malicious branch) into the merge driver command via the `%P` placeholder and executes it with `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)`. An attacker who can cause a victim to merge an untrusted branch can achieve arbitrary command execution by crafting malicious file paths.

## Description

- **Type:** Command Injection - **Source:** `merge.py` line 195 — path from merge tree (from repository content when merging untrusted branch) - **Sink:** `merge_drivers.py` lines 124–127 — `subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)` where `cmd` includes path via `%P` placeholder - **Impact:** Arbitrary code execution when merging from a malicious repository. Requires the user to have a merge driver configured that uses the `%P` placeholder.

## Resources

- Repository: https://github.com/dulwich/dulwich - Vulnerable file: `dulwich/merge_drivers.py` (lines 119–129)

## Proof of Concept

```python from dulwich.attrs import GitAttributes, Pattern from dulwich.config import ConfigDict from dulwich.merge import merge_blobs from dulwich.objects import Blob

# Merge driver with %P (path) - typical for custom merge tools config = ConfigDict() config.set((b"merge", b"injectable"), b"driver", b"echo %P > %A")

patterns = [(Pattern(b"*"), {b"merge": b"injectable"})] gitattributes = GitAttributes(patterns)

base = Blob.from_string(b"base") ours = Blob.from_string(b"ours") theirs = Blob.from_strin…

python311-dulwich-1.2.5-1.1 on GA media

Affected: PyPI: dulwich

## Summary

Dulwich's `ProcessMergeDriver` substitutes the file path (from the git tree, controllable by an attacker via a malicious branch) into the merge driver command via the `%P` placeholder and executes it with `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)`. An attacker who can cause a victim to merge an untrusted branch can achieve arbitrary command execution by crafting malicious file paths.

## Description

- **Type:** Command Injection - **Source:** `merge.py` line 195 — path from merge tree (from repository content when merging untrusted branch) - **Sink:** `merge_drivers.py` lines 124–127 — `subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)` where `cmd` includes path via `%P` placeholder - **Impact:** Arbitrary code execution when merging from a malicious repository. Requires the user to have a merge driver configured that uses the `%P` placeholder.

## Resources

- Repository: https://github.com/dulwich/dulwich - Vulnerable file: `dulwich/merge_drivers.py` (lines 119–129)

## Proof of Concept

```python from dulwich.attrs import GitAttributes, Pattern from dulwich.config import ConfigDict from dulwich.merge import merge_blobs from dulwich.objects import Blob

# Merge driver with %P (path) - typical for custom merge tools config = ConfigDict() config.set((b"merge", b"injectable"), b"driver", b"echo %P > %A")

patterns = [(Pattern(b"*"), {b"merge": b"injectable"})] gitattributes = GitAttributes(patterns)

base = Blob.from_string(b"base") ours = Blob.from_string(b"ours") theirs = Blob.from_strin…

Affected: Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: dulwich, Ubuntu:25.10: dulwich, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: dulwich

Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.24.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, Dulwich's `ProcessMergeDriver` substitutes the file path (from the git tree, controllable by an attacker via a malicious branch) into the merge driver command via the `%P` placeholder and executes it with `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)`. An attacker who can cause a victim to merge an untrusted branch can achieve arbitrary command execution by crafting malicious file paths. Version 1.2.5 fixes the issue.

Ein entfernter, anonymer oder authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in verschiedenen Komponenten von Drittanbietern in Oracle Solaris ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.