https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-03T22:22:51.379981+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-06314 bdu:2026-06314 2026-10-03T22:22:51.445970+00:00 bdu:2026-06314 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-308597 EUVD-2026-308597 2026-10-03T22:22:51.446006+00:00 EUVD-2026-308597 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42238 fkie_cve-2026-42238 2026-10-03T22:22:51.446021+00:00

Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.8, nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (POST /api/restore) that is completely unauthenticated during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application's configuration file (app.ini) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored app.ini, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the TestConfigCmd setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically root in Docker deployments. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.8.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4pvg-prr3-9cxr GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr — Nginx-UI is Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Backup Restore 2026-10-03T22:22:51.446059+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui

**Product:** nginx-ui **Repository:** `0xJacky/nginx-ui` (branch: `dev`) **Vulnerability Class:** Authentication Bypass → Arbitrary File Write → OS Command Injection **Affected Component:** `POST /api/restore`

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## 1. Vulnerability Summary

nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (`POST /api/restore`) that is **completely unauthenticated** during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application's configuration file (`app.ini`) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored `app.ini`, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the `TestConfigCmd` setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically `root` in Docker deployments.

The 10-minute unauthenticated window resets on every process restart, making this exploitable not only on initial deployments but on any restart event (container restart, upgrade, health-check-triggered restart).

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## 2. Root Cause Analysis

### 2.1 The Restore Route Is Registered Without Authentication

`backup.InitRouter` is called on the `root` group, which carries only `IPWhiteList()` middleware — no `AuthRequired()`: [1](#2-0)

The route definition: [2](#2-1)

### 2.2 The `authIfInstalled` Guard Has a Time-Bounded Bypass

The only authentication guard on the restore route is…

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1276 WID-SEC-W-2026-1276 — nginx-ui: Mehrere Schwachstellen 2026-10-03T22:22:51.446162+00:00

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in nginx-ui ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code mit Root-Rechten auszuführen, sich Administratorrechte zu verschaffen und die vollständige Kontrolle über das System zu erlangen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.