PPTAgent is an agentic framework for reflective PowerPoint generation. Prior to commit 418491a, there is an arbitrary file write vulnerability via `save_generated_slides`. This issue has been patched via commit 418491a.

Affected: PyPI: pptagent

## Summary

> This vulnerability has been fixed in https://github.com/icip-cas/PPTAgent/commit/418491a9a1c02d9d93194b5973bb58df35cf9d00.

The `save_generated_slides` MCP tool accepts a pptx_path argument and writes the generated PPTX file to that path without any workspace restriction or path validation:

```python # pptagent/mcp_server.py:288-300 async def save_generated_slides(pptx_path: str): """Save the generated slides to a PowerPoint file.

Args: pptx_path: The path to save the PowerPoint file """ pptx = Path(pptx_path) assert len(self.slides), ( "No slides generated, please call `generate_slide` first" ) pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # ← creates arbitrary directories self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path) # ← writes to arbitrary path ```

The call to `pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)` creates any intermediate directories, and `self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path)` writes a valid PPTX binary (ZIP archive) to the specified path. No is_relative_to(workspace) check is performed — contrast with download_file in deeppresenter/tools/search.py:290, which correctly enforces workspace confinement.

The server changes directory to WORKSPACE (if set) on startup, so relative paths land in the workspace. Absolute paths, however, reach any filesystem location accessible to the server process.

## Impact

The concrete attack scenarios include

1. Cron persistence (root-running server): `pptx_path =…

Affected: PyPI: pptagent

## Summary

> This vulnerability has been fixed in https://github.com/icip-cas/PPTAgent/commit/418491a9a1c02d9d93194b5973bb58df35cf9d00.

The `save_generated_slides` MCP tool accepts a pptx_path argument and writes the generated PPTX file to that path without any workspace restriction or path validation:

```python # pptagent/mcp_server.py:288-300 async def save_generated_slides(pptx_path: str): """Save the generated slides to a PowerPoint file.

Args: pptx_path: The path to save the PowerPoint file """ pptx = Path(pptx_path) assert len(self.slides), ( "No slides generated, please call `generate_slide` first" ) pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # ← creates arbitrary directories self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path) # ← writes to arbitrary path ```

The call to `pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)` creates any intermediate directories, and `self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path)` writes a valid PPTX binary (ZIP archive) to the specified path. No is_relative_to(workspace) check is performed — contrast with download_file in deeppresenter/tools/search.py:290, which correctly enforces workspace confinement.

The server changes directory to WORKSPACE (if set) on startup, so relative paths land in the workspace. Absolute paths, however, reach any filesystem location accessible to the server process.

## Impact

The concrete attack scenarios include

1. Cron persistence (root-running server): `pptx_path =…