Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: sqlpad

Package sqlpad version 7.5.7-r2 fixes 26 vulnerabilities: ghsa-2v35-w6hq-6mfw, ghsa-f6ww-3ggp-fr8h, ghsa-wh4c-j3r5-mjhp, ghsa-x6wf-f3px-wcqx, ghsa-j759-j44w-7fr8...

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, the package allows attacker-controlled processing instruction data to be serialized into XML without validating or neutralizing the PI-closing sequence ?>. As a result, an attacker can terminate the processing instruction early and inject arbitrary XML nodes into the serialized output. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.

Affected: npm: @xmldom/xmldom, npm: xmldom

## Summary

The package allows attacker-controlled processing instruction data to be serialized into XML without validating or neutralizing the PI-closing sequence `?>`. As a result, an attacker can terminate the processing instruction early and inject arbitrary XML nodes into the serialized output.

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## Details

The issue is in the DOM construction and serialization flow for processing instruction nodes.

When `createProcessingInstruction(target, data)` is called, the supplied `data` string is stored directly on the node without validation. Later, when the document is serialized, the serializer writes PI nodes by concatenating `<?`, the target, a space, `node.data`, and `?>` directly.

That behavior is unsafe because processing instructions are a syntax-sensitive context. The closing delimiter `?>` terminates the PI. If attacker-controlled input contains `?>`, the serializer does not preserve it as literal PI content. Instead, it emits output where the remainder of the payload is treated as live XML markup.

The same class of vulnerability was previously addressed for CDATA sections (GHSA-wh4c-j3r5-mjhp / CVE-2026-34601), where `]]>` in CDATA data was handled by splitting. The serializer applies no equivalent protection to processing instruction data.

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## Affected code

**`lib/dom.js` — `createProcessingInstruction` (lines 2240–2246):**

```js createProcessingInstruction: function (target, data) { var node = new ProcessingInstruction(PDC); node.ownerDocumen…

fast-uri: fast-uri: Path traversal vulnerability allows bypass of security policies fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling vm2: vm2: Arbitrary code execution via sandbox breakout through inspect function crypto/x509: golang: Go crypto/x509: Denial of Service via inefficient certificate chain validation protobufjs: protobufjs: Arbitrary code execution via injected protobuf definition type fields xmldom: @xmldom/xmldom: xmldom: Arbitrary XML Node Injection @xmldom/xmldom: xmldom: xmldom: Denial of Service via deeply nested XML documents xmldom: xmldom: Arbitrary XML markup injection xmldom: xmldom: Arbitrary XML node injection via crafted processing instructions protobufjs: protobufjs: Arbitrary code execution due to unsafe expression generation from crafted protobuf descriptors

Affected: Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:25.10: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-xmldom

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, the package allows attacker-controlled processing instruction data to be serialized into XML without validating or neutralizing the PI-closing sequence ?>. As a result, an attacker can terminate the processing instruction early and inject arbitrary XML nodes into the serialized output. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um Dateien zu manipulieren oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.