Affected: Alpaquita:23: docker, Alpaquita:25: docker, Alpaquita:stream: docker

Affected: CleanStart: amazon-cloudwatch-agent, CleanStart: prometheus-fips, CleanStart: rancher-agent

CVE-2026-41567 affects multiple packages. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container's filesystem rather than the host's due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images

Affected: Go: github.com/moby/moby/v2, Go: github.com/docker/docker, Go: github.com/moby/moby

## Summary

When a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges.

## Details

When handling `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container's filesystem rather than the host's. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container.

The executed binary runs with the daemon's full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities.

## Impact

Arbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary.

### Conditions for exploitation

- A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary. - The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via `docker cp -` or by calling the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API directly with compressed content.

### Not affected

Standard `docker cp` usage is **not** affected, because the CLI sends uncompressed tar by default:

``` docker cp ./file.txt mycontainer:/file.txt ```

This can only be exploited when explicitly passing a xz or gzip-compressed archive to `docker cp` or the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API, for…

docker-stable-24.0.9_ce-18.1 on GA media

github.com/containerd/containerd: containerd local privilege escalation containerd: containerd has an integer overflow in User ID handling runc: runc can be tricked into creating empty files/directories on host noobaa-core: Excessive permissions of /etc could lead to escalation of privilege in the noobaa-core container go-git: argument injection via the URL field go-git: go-git clients vulnerable to DoS via maliciously crafted Git server replies golang.org/x/net/proxy: golang.org/x/net/http/httpproxy: HTTP Proxy bypass using IPv6 Zone IDs in golang.org/x/net golang.org/x/net/html: Quadratic parsing complexity in golang.org/x/net/html runc: opencontainers/selinux: container escape and denial of service due to arbitrary write gadgets and procfs write redirects github.com/moby/moby: Moby's Firewalld reload removes bridge network isolation github.com/ulikunitz/xz: github.com/ulikunitz/xz leaks memory github.com/containerd/containerd: containerd: Memory exhaustion via CRI Attach implementation goroutine leaks github.com/sigstore/fulcio: Fulcio: Denial of Service via crafted OpenID Connect (OIDC) token fulcio: Fulcio: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via unanchored regex in MetaIssuer URL validation github.com/sigstore/rekor: Rekor denial of service github.com/sigstore/rekor: Rekor Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Denial of Service due to excessive HTML parsing golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution…

Security update for docker

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: docker.io-app, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: docker.io-app, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: docker.io-app, Ubuntu:25.10: docker.io, Ubuntu:25.10: docker.io-app and 2 more

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container's filesystem rather than the host's due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images

Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in docker ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode mit Administratorrechten auszuführen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen oder Daten zu manipulieren.