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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-03T18:31:37.357628+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-293120</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-293120</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T18:31:37.443911+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-293120</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-293120"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41488</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-41488</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T18:31:37.443947+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to 1.1.14, langchain-openai's _url_to_size() helper (used by get_num_tokens_from_messages for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could resolve to a public IP during validation and then to a private/localhost IP during the actual fetch.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41488"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r</id>
    <title>GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r — langchain-openai: Image token counting SSRF protection can be bypassed via DNS rebinding</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T18:31:37.443982+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langchain-openai</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`langchain-openai`'s `_url_to_size()` helper (used by `get_num_tokens_from_messages` for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could resolve to a public IP during validation and then to a private/localhost IP during the actual fetch.</p>
<p>The practical impact is limited because the fetched response body is passed directly to Pillow's `Image.open()` to extract dimensions — the response content is never returned, logged, or otherwise exposed to the caller. An attacker cannot exfiltrate data from internal services through this path. A potential risk is blind probing (inferring whether an internal host/port is open based on timing or error behavior).</p>
<p>## Affected versions</p>
<p>- `langchain-openai` &lt; 1.1.14</p>
<p>## Patched versions</p>
<p>- `langchain-openai` &gt;= 1.1.14 (requires `langchain-core` &gt;= 1.2.31)</p>
<p>## Affected code</p>
<p>**File:** `libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py` — `_url_to_size()`</p>
<p>The vulnerable pattern was a validate-then-fetch with separate DNS resolution:</p>
<p>```python
validate_safe_url(image_source, allow_private=False, allow_http=True)
# ... separate network operation with independent DNS resolution ...
response = httpx.get(image_source, timeout=timeout)
```</p>
<p>## Fix</p>
<p>The fix replaces the validate-then-fetch pattern with an SSRF-safe httpx transport (`SSRFSafeSyncTransport`…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-76</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-76</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T18:31:37.444034+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langchain-openai</p>
<p>LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to 1.1.14, langchain-openai's _url_to_size() helper (used by get_num_tokens_from_messages for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could resolve to a public IP during validation and then to a private/localhost IP during the actual fetch.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-76"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1275</id>
    <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1275 — LangChain (openai, text-splitters): Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Offenlegung von Informationen und SSRF-Umgehung</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T18:31:37.444057+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in LangChain ausnutzen, um SSRF-Schutzmaßnahmen zu umgehen und Informationen offenzulegen.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1275"/>
  </entry>
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