https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-03T10:34:11.275615+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-cve-2026-40110 BREW-jupyterlab-CVE-2026-40110 — Jupyter Server has a CORS Origin Validation Bypass via `re.match()` in `allow_origin_pat` 2026-10-03T10:34:11.606627+00:00

Affected: Homebrew: jupyterlab

Jupyter Server uses `re.match()` to validate the Origin header against the `allow_origin_pat` configuration.

Since `re.match()` only anchors at the start of the string, an attacker who controls a domain like `http://trusted.example.com.evil.com/` passes validation against a pattern intended to match only `trusted.example.com`.

### Impact

<=2.17.0

### Patches

057869a327c46730afede3eab0ca2d2e3e74acea, 49b34392feaa97735b3b777e3baf8f22f2a14ed8

### Workarounds

Wrap your `allow_origin_pat` value with `^` and `$`

### References

https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/pull/603 https://docs.python.org/3/library/re.html#re.fullmatch https://docs.python.org/3/library/re.html#re.match

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-gg76429 Withdrawn: CLEANSTART-2026-GG76429 — Security fixes in tensorflow-gpu-jupyter 2.21.0-r5 2026-10-03T10:34:11.606719+00:00

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: tensorflow-gpu-jupyter

Package tensorflow-gpu-jupyter version 2.21.0-r5 fixes 28 vulnerabilities: ghsa-rch3-82jr-f9w9, ghsa-mqcg-5x36-vfcg, ghsa-37w4-hwhx-4rc4, ghsa-mf9v-mfxr-j63j, ghsa-5mrq-x3x5-8v8f...

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339282 EUVD-2026-339282 2026-10-03T10:34:11.606746+00:00 EUVD-2026-339282 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40110 fkie_cve-2026-40110 2026-10-03T10:34:11.606761+00:00

Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the Origin header validation uses Python's re.match() to check incoming origins against the allow_origin_pat configuration value. Because re.match() only anchors at the start of the string and does not require a full match, a pattern intended to match only a trusted domain (e.g., trusted.example.com) will also match any origin that begins with that domain followed by additional characters (e.g., trusted.example.com.evil.com). An attacker who controls such a domain can bypass the CORS origin restriction and make cross-origin requests to the Jupyter Server API from an untrusted site. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-24qx-w28j-9m6p GHSA-24qx-w28j-9m6p — Jupyter Server has a CORS Origin Validation Bypass via `re.match()` in `allow_origin_pat` 2026-10-03T10:34:11.606790+00:00

Affected: PyPI: jupyter-server

Jupyter Server uses `re.match()` to validate the Origin header against the `allow_origin_pat` configuration.

Since `re.match()` only anchors at the start of the string, an attacker who controls a domain like `http://trusted.example.com.evil.com/` passes validation against a pattern intended to match only `trusted.example.com`.

### Impact

<=2.17.0

### Patches

057869a327c46730afede3eab0ca2d2e3e74acea, 49b34392feaa97735b3b777e3baf8f22f2a14ed8

### Workarounds

Wrap your `allow_origin_pat` value with `^` and `$`

### References

https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/pull/603 https://docs.python.org/3/library/re.html#re.fullmatch https://docs.python.org/3/library/re.html#re.match

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4080 OESA-2026-4080 — python-jupyter-server security update 2026-10-03T10:34:11.606870+00:00

Affected: openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4: python-jupyter-server

The backend for Jupyter web applications Security Fix(es):

Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In jupyter_server versions through 2.17.0, the next query parameter in the login flow is insufficiently validated in `LoginFormHandler._redirect_safe()`, which allows redirects to arbitrary external domains via values such as `///example.com`. An attacker can use a crafted login URL to redirect users to a malicious site and facilitate phishing attacks. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2025-61669)

Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, a path traversal vulnerability in the REST API allows an authenticated user to escape the configured root_dir and access sibling directories whose names begin with the same prefix as the root_dir. For example, with a root_dir named &quot;test&quot;, the API permits access to a sibling directory named &quot;testtest&quot; through a crafted request to the /api/contents endpoint using encoded path components. An attacker can read, write, and delete files in affected sibling directories. Multi-tenant deployments using predictable naming schemes are particularly at risk, as a user with a directory named &quot;user1&quot; could access directories for user10 through user19 and beyond. A user who can choose a single-character folder name could gain access to a significant number of sibling directories.

Version 2.18.0 contains a fix. As a workaround, ensure folder nam…

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10710-1 openSUSE-SU-2026:10710-1 — python311-jupyter-server-2.18.1-1.1 on GA media 2026-10-03T10:34:11.606915+00:00

python311-jupyter-server-2.18.1-1.1 on GA media

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2187 PYSEC-2026-2187 2026-10-03T10:34:11.606938+00:00

Affected: PyPI: jupyter-server

Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the Origin header validation uses Python's re.match() to check incoming origins against the allow_origin_pat configuration value. Because re.match() only anchors at the start of the string and does not require a full match, a pattern intended to match only a trusted domain (e.g., trusted.example.com) will also match any origin that begins with that domain followed by additional characters (e.g., trusted.example.com.evil.com). An attacker who controls such a domain can bypass the CORS origin restriction and make cross-origin requests to the Jupyter Server API from an untrusted site. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:43038 RHSA-2026:43038 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Migration Toolkit for Applications 2026-10-03T10:34:11.606962+00:00

jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling fast-uri: fast-uri: Security policy bypass due to improper Unicode hostname canonicalization golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass python-dotenv: python-dotenv: Arbitrary file overwrite via symbolic link following mistune: Mistune: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via crafted Markdown input net: golang: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input to CookieJar.load() jupyter-server: Jupyter Server: Unauthorized File Access via Path Traversal Vulnerability net/mail: golang: Go net/mail: Denial of Service via crafted email inputs golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing jupyter-server: Jupyter Server: Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) bypass via improper Origin header validation Jupyter Notebook: JupyterLab: @jupyter-notebook/help-extension: @jupyterlab/help-extension: Jupyter Notebook and JupyterLab: Session takeover via stored cross-site scripting jupyterlab: JupyterLab: Arbitrary code execution due to improper enforcement of extension allow-list net/mail: golang: net/mail…

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-40110 UBUNTU-CVE-2026-40110 2026-10-03T10:34:11.607038+00:00

Affected: Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: jupyter-server, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: jupyter-server, Ubuntu:25.10: jupyter-server, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: jupyter-server

Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the Origin header validation uses Python's re.match() to check incoming origins against the allow_origin_pat configuration value. Because re.match() only anchors at the start of the string and does not require a full match, a pattern intended to match only a trusted domain (e.g., trusted.example.com) will also match any origin that begins with that domain followed by additional characters (e.g., trusted.example.com.evil.com). An attacker who controls such a domain can bypass the CORS origin restriction and make cross-origin requests to the Jupyter Server API from an untrusted site. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.