PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.115, execute_code() in praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools defaults to sandbox_mode="sandbox", which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a restricted __builtins__ dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist embedded inside the subprocess wrapper (blocked_attrs of python_tools.py) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+ names blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a frame-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list (__traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, and f_builtins). Chaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python builtins dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which exec can be retrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every remaining security layer. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.115.

Affected: PyPI: praisonaiagents

## Summary

`execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools` defaults to `sandbox_mode="sandbox"`, which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a restricted `__builtins__` dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist embedded inside the subprocess wrapper (`blocked_attrs`, line 143 of `python_tools.py`) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+ names blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a frame-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list:

| Attribute | In subprocess `blocked_attrs` | In direct-mode `_blocked_attrs` | |---|---|---| | `__traceback__` | **NO** | YES | | `tb_frame` | **NO** | YES | | `f_back` | **NO** | YES | | `f_builtins` | **NO** | YES |

Chaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python `builtins` dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which `exec` can be retrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every remaining security layer.

**Tested and confirmed on praisonaiagents 1.5.113 (latest), Python 3.10.**

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## Severity

**CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical**

| Vector | Value | Rationale | |---|---|---| | AV:N | Network | `execute_code` is a designated agent tool; user/LLM-supplied code reaches it over the network in all standard deployments | | AC:L | Low | No race conditions or special configuration required | | PR:L | Low | Requires ability to submit code through an agent (t…

Affected: PyPI: praisonaiagents

## Summary

`execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools` defaults to `sandbox_mode="sandbox"`, which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a restricted `__builtins__` dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist embedded inside the subprocess wrapper (`blocked_attrs`, line 143 of `python_tools.py`) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+ names blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a frame-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list:

| Attribute | In subprocess `blocked_attrs` | In direct-mode `_blocked_attrs` | |---|---|---| | `__traceback__` | **NO** | YES | | `tb_frame` | **NO** | YES | | `f_back` | **NO** | YES | | `f_builtins` | **NO** | YES |

Chaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python `builtins` dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which `exec` can be retrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every remaining security layer.

**Tested and confirmed on praisonaiagents 1.5.113 (latest), Python 3.10.**

---

## Severity

**CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical**

| Vector | Value | Rationale | |---|---|---| | AV:N | Network | `execute_code` is a designated agent tool; user/LLM-supplied code reaches it over the network in all standard deployments | | AC:L | Low | No race conditions or special configuration required | | PR:L | Low | Requires ability to submit code through an agent…