Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

# Title

`browser.request` still allows `POST /reset-profile` through the `operator.write` surface in OpenClaw `v2026.3.22` after `GHSA-vmhq-cqm9-6p7q`

## Severity Assessment

High

CWE:

- `CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization`

Proposed CVSS v3.1:

- `8.1` (`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`)

An authenticated caller who only has access to the scoped Gateway method `browser.request` on the `operator.write` surface can still reach a destructive persistent-profile management route.

Likely related advisory family:

- `GHSA-vmhq-cqm9-6p7q`

This should be treated as a later-version residual or incomplete fix. The earlier fix blocked `POST /profiles/create` and profile deletion, but the latest released `v2026.3.22` code still omits `POST /reset-profile` from the same mutation gate.

## Impact

A caller with `operator.write` access to `browser.request` can still trigger persistent profile reset via `POST /reset-profile`.

This crosses the intended privilege boundary for browser profile management because the release already attempts to block adjacent persistent profile mutations on this same surface.

In practice, the allowed route reaches destructive behavior that can:

- stop the running browser for that profile - close the Playwright browser connection for that profile - move the profile's local `userDataDir` to Trash when it exists

This is a real integrity and availability impact on persistent browser s…

OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability in the POST /reset-profile endpoint that allows authenticated callers with operator.write access to browser.request to bypass profile mutation restrictions. Attackers can invoke POST /reset-profile through the browser.request surface to stop the running browser, close Playwright connections, and move profile directories to Trash, crossing intended privilege boundaries.

Affected: npm: openclaw

> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

# Title

`browser.request` still allows `POST /reset-profile` through the `operator.write` surface in OpenClaw `v2026.3.22` after `GHSA-vmhq-cqm9-6p7q`

## Severity Assessment

High

CWE:

- `CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization`

Proposed CVSS v3.1:

- `8.1` (`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`)

An authenticated caller who only has access to the scoped Gateway method `browser.request` on the `operator.write` surface can still reach a destructive persistent-profile management route.

Likely related advisory family:

- `GHSA-vmhq-cqm9-6p7q`

This should be treated as a later-version residual or incomplete fix. The earlier fix blocked `POST /profiles/create` and profile deletion, but the latest released `v2026.3.22` code still omits `POST /reset-profile` from the same mutation gate.

## Impact

A caller with `operator.write` access to `browser.request` can still trigger persistent profile reset via `POST /reset-profile`.

This crosses the intended privilege boundary for browser profile management because the release already attempts to block adjacent persistent profile mutations on this same surface.

In practice, the allowed route reaches destructive behavior that can:

- stop the running browser for that profile - close the Playwright browser connection for that profile - move the profile's local `userDataDir` to Trash when it exists

This is a real integrity and availability impact on persistent browser s…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um Administratorrechte zu erlangen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten offenzulegen oder zu manipulieren oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.