LMDeploy is a toolkit for compressing, deploying, and serving large language models. Versions prior to 0.12.3 have a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in LMDeploy's vision-language module. The `load_image()` function in `lmdeploy/vl/utils.py` fetches arbitrary URLs without validating internal/private IP addresses, allowing attackers to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and sensitive resources. Version 0.12.3 patches the issue.

Affected: PyPI: lmdeploy

## Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in LMDeploy's vision-language module. The `load_image()` function in `lmdeploy/vl/utils.py` fetches arbitrary URLs without validating internal/private IP addresses, allowing attackers to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and sensitive resources.

## Affected Versions

- **Tested on:** main branch (2026-02-04) - **Affected:** All versions prior to 0.12.3

## Vulnerable Code

**File:** `lmdeploy/vl/utils.py` (lines 64-67) ```python def load_image(image_url: Union[str, Image.Image]) -> Image.Image: # ... if image_url.startswith('http'): response = requests.get(image_url, headers=headers, timeout=FETCH_TIMEOUT) # NO VALIDATION OF URL/IP BEFORE REQUEST ```

**Also affected:** `encode_image_base64()` function (lines 26-29)

## Root Cause

1. No validation of URLs before fetching 2. No blocklist for internal IPs (127.0.0.1, 169.254.x.x, 10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x) 3. Server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default (api_server.py line 1393) 4. API keys disabled by default

## Attack Scenario

1. LMDeploy server deployed with vision-language model 2. Attacker sends request to `/v1/chat/completions` with malicious `image_url`: ```python POST /v1/chat/completions { "model": "internlm-xcomposer2", "messages": [{ "role": "user", "content": [ {"type": "text", "text": "Describe this image"}, {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-da…

Affected: PyPI: lmdeploy

## Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in LMDeploy's vision-language module. The `load_image()` function in `lmdeploy/vl/utils.py` fetches arbitrary URLs without validating internal/private IP addresses, allowing attackers to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and sensitive resources.

## Affected Versions

- **Tested on:** main branch (2026-02-04) - **Affected:** All versions prior to 0.12.3

## Vulnerable Code

**File:** `lmdeploy/vl/utils.py` (lines 64-67) ```python def load_image(image_url: Union[str, Image.Image]) -> Image.Image: # ... if image_url.startswith('http'): response = requests.get(image_url, headers=headers, timeout=FETCH_TIMEOUT) # NO VALIDATION OF URL/IP BEFORE REQUEST ```

**Also affected:** `encode_image_base64()` function (lines 26-29)

## Root Cause

1. No validation of URLs before fetching 2. No blocklist for internal IPs (127.0.0.1, 169.254.x.x, 10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x) 3. Server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default (api_server.py line 1393) 4. API keys disabled by default

## Attack Scenario

1. LMDeploy server deployed with vision-language model 2. Attacker sends request to `/v1/chat/completions` with malicious `image_url`: ```python POST /v1/chat/completions { "model": "internlm-xcomposer2", "messages": [{ "role": "user", "content": [ {"type": "text", "text": "Describe this image"}, {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-da…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Mozilla Thunderbird, Mozilla Firefox ESR und Mozilla Firefox ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um falsche Informationen darzustellen, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.