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EUVD-2026-277229

2026-10-02T14:29:01.406442+00:00

EUVD-2026-277229

fkie_cve-2026-33497

2026-10-02T14:29:01.406489+00:00

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.1, in the download_profile_picture function of the /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint, the folder_name and file_name parameters are not strictly filtered, which allows the secret_key to be read across directories. Version 1.7.1 contains a patch.

GHSA-ph9w-r52h-28p7 — langflow: /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint file reading

2026-10-02T14:29:01.406536+00:00

Affected: PyPI: langflow

## Vulnerability

### Path Traversal in `GET /api/v1/files/profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name}`

The `download_profile_picture` function in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py` constructed file paths by directly concatenating the user-supplied `folder_name` and `file_name` path parameters without sanitization or boundary validation. The resulting path was passed to the filesystem without verifying it remained within the intended directory.

An unauthenticated attacker could supply traversal sequences (e.g. `../secret_key`) to navigate outside the profile pictures directory and read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.

This exposed the server to:

- **Sensitive file disclosure** — any file readable by the application process could be retrieved - **Secret key exfiltration** — the application's `secret_key` file, used as JWT signing material, could be read directly via `../secret_key` - **Authentication bypass** — with the `secret_key` in hand, an attacker can forge valid JWT tokens and authenticate as any user, including administrators

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## Proof of Concept

```bash curl --path-as-is 'http://:7860/api/v1/files/profile_pictures/../secret_key' ```

A successful response returns the raw secret key value used to sign all JWT authentication tokens in the instance.

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## Fix

The fix was applied in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py` (PR #12263).

Two layers of defense were introduced:

**1. Typed path validation** — the `folder_name` and `fi…

PYSEC-2026-81

2026-10-02T14:29:01.406626+00:00

Affected: PyPI: langflow

WID-SEC-W-2026-0823 — Langflow: Mehrere Schwachstellen

2026-10-02T14:29:01.406658+00:00

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Langflow ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, und potenziell um Daten zu manipulieren.