PySpector is a static analysis security testing (SAST) Framework engineered for modern Python development workflows. PySpector versions 0.1.6 and prior are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The validate_plugin_code() function in plugin_system.py, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the internal resolve_name() helper only handles ast.Name and ast.Attribute node types, returning None for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via getattr() (such as getattr(os, 'system')) the outer call's func node is of type ast.Call, causing resolve_name() to return None, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user's machine when loaded. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.

Affected: PyPI: pyspector

### Summary PySpector versions `<= 0.1.6` are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The `validate_plugin_code()` function in `plugin_system.py`, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the `internal resolve_name()` helper only handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` node types, returning `None` for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via `getattr()` (such as `getattr(os, 'system')`) the outer call's func node is of type `ast.Call`, causing `resolve_name()` to return `None`, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user's machine when loaded.

### Impact An attacker who can deliver a malicious plugin file to a PySpector user and convince them to install it, can achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's local machine. Exploitation requires the victim to explicitly run `pyspector plugin install --trust` on the malicious file (a deliberate multi-step action that meaningfully limits the attack surface compared to passive vulnerabilities). However, the bypass directly undermines the security guarantee that `validate_plugin_code()` is designed to provide. Once the plugin is trusted and executed, the following is achievable: - Full read/write access to the local filesystem - Exfiltration of sensitive data and environment variables (i.e. API keys, credentials, etc...) -…

Affected: PyPI: pyspector

### Summary PySpector versions `<= 0.1.6` are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The `validate_plugin_code()` function in `plugin_system.py`, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the `internal resolve_name()` helper only handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` node types, returning `None` for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via `getattr()` (such as `getattr(os, 'system')`) the outer call's func node is of type `ast.Call`, causing `resolve_name()` to return `None`, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user's machine when loaded.

### Impact An attacker who can deliver a malicious plugin file to a PySpector user and convince them to install it, can achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's local machine. Exploitation requires the victim to explicitly run `pyspector plugin install --trust` on the malicious file (a deliberate multi-step action that meaningfully limits the attack surface compared to passive vulnerabilities). However, the bypass directly undermines the security guarantee that `validate_plugin_code()` is designed to provide. Once the plugin is trusted and executed, the following is achievable: - Full read/write access to the local filesystem - Exfiltration of sensitive data and environment variables (i.e. API keys, credentials, etc...) -…