Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

### Summary A wrapper-depth parsing mismatch in `system.run` allowed nested transparent dispatch wrappers (for example repeated `/usr/bin/env`) to suppress shell-wrapper detection while still matching allowlist resolution. In `security=allowlist` + `ask=on-miss`, this could bypass the expected approval prompt for shell execution.

### Severity / Trust Model OpenClaw’s documented model treats authenticated gateway callers as trusted operators and exec approvals as operator guardrails. This issue is still a real approval-boundary bypass and is triaged as **Medium** in that model.

### Technical Details - Dispatch-wrapper unwrapping stopped at `MAX_DISPATCH_WRAPPER_DEPTH`. - Shell-wrapper extraction could return non-wrapper once depth was exhausted. - Allowlist resolution could still succeed on partially unwrapped argv beginning with `/usr/bin/env`. - Result: nested wrapper chains could execute `/bin/sh -c ...` without fresh approval in `allowlist` + `ask=on-miss`.

### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published version at triage time: `2026.2.23` - Vulnerable versions: `<= 2026.2.23` - Patched versions (planned next release): `>= 2026.2.24`

### Fix Commit(s) - `57c9a18180c8b14885bbd95474cbb17ff2d03f0b`

### Verification - Added regression coverage for depth-overflow wrapper chains at resolution and `system.run` invocation layers. - Reproduced previous PoC behavior before fix, then confirmed denial after fix with `SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval re…

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.24 contain an approval gating bypass vulnerability in system.run allowlist mode where nested transparent dispatch wrappers can suppress shell-wrapper detection. Attackers can exploit this by chaining multiple dispatch wrappers like /usr/bin/env to execute /bin/sh -c commands without triggering the expected approval prompt in allowlist plus ask=on-miss configurations.

Affected: npm: openclaw

### Summary A wrapper-depth parsing mismatch in `system.run` allowed nested transparent dispatch wrappers (for example repeated `/usr/bin/env`) to suppress shell-wrapper detection while still matching allowlist resolution. In `security=allowlist` + `ask=on-miss`, this could bypass the expected approval prompt for shell execution.

### Severity / Trust Model OpenClaw’s documented model treats authenticated gateway callers as trusted operators and exec approvals as operator guardrails. This issue is still a real approval-boundary bypass and is triaged as **Medium** in that model.

### Technical Details - Dispatch-wrapper unwrapping stopped at `MAX_DISPATCH_WRAPPER_DEPTH`. - Shell-wrapper extraction could return non-wrapper once depth was exhausted. - Allowlist resolution could still succeed on partially unwrapped argv beginning with `/usr/bin/env`. - Result: nested wrapper chains could execute `/bin/sh -c ...` without fresh approval in `allowlist` + `ask=on-miss`.

### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published version at triage time: `2026.2.23` - Vulnerable versions: `<= 2026.2.23` - Patched versions (planned next release): `>= 2026.2.24`

### Fix Commit(s) - `57c9a18180c8b14885bbd95474cbb17ff2d03f0b`

### Verification - Added regression coverage for depth-overflow wrapper chains at resolution and `system.run` invocation layers. - Reproduced previous PoC behavior before fix, then confirmed denial after fix with `SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval re…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, sich erhöhte Berechtigungen zu verschaffen, Daten zu manipulieren, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder andere nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.