Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()

The `check_command_size_in_blocks()` function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting `common->data_size_from_cmnd` by the block size (`common->curlun->blkbits`). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.

Initially, the block size is set up in `fsg_lun_open()` , and the `common->data_size_from_cmnd` is set up in `do_scsi_command()`. During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.

So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (`common->data_size_from_cmnd`), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.

Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the shift and catch any overflows.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()

The `check_command_size_in_blocks()` function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting `common->data_size_from_cmnd` by the block size (`common->curlun->blkbits`). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.

Initially, the block size is set up in `fsg_lun_open()` , and the `common->data_size_from_cmnd` is set up in `do_scsi_command()`. During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.

So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (`common->data_size_from_cmnd`), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.

Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the shift and catch any overflows.

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 232 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks() The `check_command_size_in_blocks()` function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting `common->data_size_from_cmnd` by the block size (`common->curlun->blkbits`). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow. Initially, the block size is set up in `fsg_lun_open()` , and the `common->data_size_from_cmnd` is set up in `do_scsi_command()`. During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables. So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (`common->data_size_from_cmnd`), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses. Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the shift and catch any overflows.

Ein Angreifer mit physischem Zugriff kann eine Schwachstelle im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu erzeugen oder möglicherweise beliebigen Code auszuführen oder Informationen offenzulegen.