Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

# Command hijacking via PATH handling

**Discovered:** 2026-02-04 **Reporter:** @akhmittra

## Summary

OpenClaw previously accepted untrusted PATH sources in limited situations. In affected versions, this could cause OpenClaw to resolve and execute an unintended binary ("command hijacking") when running host commands.

This issue primarily matters when OpenClaw is relying on allowlist/safe-bin protections and expects `PATH` to be trustworthy.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `< 2026.2.14` - Patched: `>= 2026.2.14` (planned next release)

## What Is Required To Trigger This

### A) Node Host PATH override (remote command hijack)

An attacker needs all of the following:

- Authenticated/authorized access to an execution surface that can invoke node-host execution (for example, a compromised gateway or a caller that can issue `system.run`). - A node host connected and exposing `system.run`. - A configuration where allowlist/safe-bins are expected to restrict execution (this is not meaningful if full arbitrary exec is already allowed). - The ability to pass request-scoped environment overrides (specifically `PATH`) into `system.run`. - A way to place an attacker-controlled executable earlier in `PATH` (for example, a writable directory on the node host), with a name that matches an allowlisted/safe-bin command that OpenClaw will run.

Notes:

- OpenClaw deployments commonly require a gateway token/password (or equivalent transport authen…

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a command hijacking vulnerability that allows attackers to execute unintended binaries by manipulating PATH environment variables through node-host execution or project-local bootstrapping. Attackers with authenticated access to node-host execution surfaces or those running OpenClaw in attacker-controlled directories can place malicious executables in PATH to override allowlisted safe-bin commands and achieve arbitrary command execution.

Affected: npm: openclaw

# Command hijacking via PATH handling

**Discovered:** 2026-02-04 **Reporter:** @akhmittra

## Summary

OpenClaw previously accepted untrusted PATH sources in limited situations. In affected versions, this could cause OpenClaw to resolve and execute an unintended binary ("command hijacking") when running host commands.

This issue primarily matters when OpenClaw is relying on allowlist/safe-bin protections and expects `PATH` to be trustworthy.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `< 2026.2.14` - Patched: `>= 2026.2.14` (planned next release)

## What Is Required To Trigger This

### A) Node Host PATH override (remote command hijack)

An attacker needs all of the following:

- Authenticated/authorized access to an execution surface that can invoke node-host execution (for example, a compromised gateway or a caller that can issue `system.run`). - A node host connected and exposing `system.run`. - A configuration where allowlist/safe-bins are expected to restrict execution (this is not meaningful if full arbitrary exec is already allowed). - The ability to pass request-scoped environment overrides (specifically `PATH`) into `system.run`. - A way to place an attacker-controlled executable earlier in `PATH` (for example, a writable directory on the node host), with a name that matches an allowlisted/safe-bin command that OpenClaw will run.

Notes:

- OpenClaw deployments commonly require a gateway token/password (or equivalent transport authen…

Ein Angreifer kann diese Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, sich erhöhte Berechtigungen zu verschaffen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder andere, nicht näher bezeichnete Angriffe durchzuführen.