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EUVD-2026-308775

2026-10-03T10:01:30.648206+00:00

EUVD-2026-308775

fkie_cve-2026-29080

2026-10-03T10:01:30.648276+00:00

A SQL injection vulnerability in `FilterEngine.create_sqla_query()` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids//dids/search`). On Oracle deployments attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into `sqlalchemy.text()` via Python `.format()`, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. This affects versions 1.27.0 and later before 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1.

The vulnerability exists in `lib/rucio/core/did_meta_plugins/filter_engine.py` within the `create_sqla_query()` method. When the database dialect is Oracle, filter expressions for JSON metadata columns are constructed using `text()` with Python string formatting. Both `key` and `value` are attacker-controlled strings derived from HTTP query parameters. The `text()` function creates a raw SQL fragment — it does **not** escape or parameterize its contents.

Any authenticated Rucio user can exploit this through the DID search API to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database. This can expose all managed data identifiers and sensitive tables such as identities, tokens, accounts, rse_settings, and rules, and may allow modification of database contents. The issue affects Oracle deployments using the default json_meta plugin and does not affect PostgreSQL or MySQ…

GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3 — Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine Oracle JSON Path via DID Search API

2026-10-03T10:01:30.648378+00:00

Affected: PyPI: rucio

### Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in the Oracle path of `FilterEngine.create_sqla_query` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids//dids/search`). Attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into `sqlalchemy.text` via Python `str.format`, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. The vulnerability is affecting deployments using the default metadata plugin configuration `json_meta` with Oracle database backends.

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### Details

**filter_engine.py:552** (string equality — default branch): ```python expression = text("json_exists({},'$?(@.{} {} \"{}\")')".format( json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value)) ```

**filter_engine.py:548** (boolean branch): ```python expression = text("json_exists({},'$?(@.{}.boolean() {} \"{}\")')".format( json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value)) ```

**filter_engine.py:550** (numeric branch — value unquoted): ```python expression = text("json_exists({},'$?(@.{} {} {})')".format( json_column.key…

PYSEC-2026-528 — Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine Oracle JSON Path via DID Search API

2026-10-03T10:01:30.648585+00:00

Affected: PyPI: rucio

### Summary

### Details

*Will follow in two weeks (2025-05-19).*

### Impact

**Vulnerability type:** SQL Injection (CWE-89)

**Who is impacted:**

- **All Oracle-based Rucio deployments** using the default metadata plugin configuration (`json_meta`). - ***Not affected*** are PostgreSQL/MySQL deployments using the default `json_meta` plugin (SQLAlchemy parameterizes the JSON path operations via bind parameters on non-Oracle dialects).

**What an attacker can do:**

- **Full database read access:** Extract any table including `identities` (password hashes and salts), `tokens` (active authentication sessions), `accounts` (user enumeration), `rse_settings` (storage endpoint credentials), and `rules` (data management policies). - **Password hash extraction:** Combined with Rucio's use of single-iteration SHA-256 for pass…