Gitea versions up to and including 1.26.1 allow Git smart HTTP requests authenticated with bearer tokens to bypass repository token scope checks.

Affected: Go: code.gitea.io/gitea

### Summary Gitea v1.26.1 enforces repository-scoped access-token permissions on repository operations. In the Git Smart HTTP path, however, this check runs only when the token is presented via HTTP Basic authentication — `CheckRepoScopedToken()` returns early unless `ctx.IsBasicAuth` is true — so the same token sent as `Authorization: Bearer <token>` bypasses the scope check entirely.

As a result, a PAT or OAuth2 token presented as a Bearer credential can clone or fetch private repositories without the `read:repository` scope, and likewise reach the Git push without `write:repository`.

### Details Git Smart HTTP routes allow both Basic auth and OAuth2/Bearer auth:

```go // routers/web/web.go addOwnerRepoGitHTTPRouters( m, repo.HTTPGitEnabledHandler, webAuth.AllowBasic, webAuth.AllowOAuth2, repo.CorsHandler(), optSignInFromAnyOrigin, context.UserAssignmentWeb(), ) ```

The Git HTTP authorization path calls `CheckRepoScopedToken()` before falling through to normal repository RBAC:

```go // routers/web/repo/githttp.go if askAuth { if !ctx.IsSigned { ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized) return nil }

context.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, repo, auth_model.GetScopeLevelFromAccessMode(accessMode)) if ctx.Written() { return nil }

// normal repository RBAC follows } ```

However, `CheckRepoScopedToken()` only enforces token scopes for Basic-authenticated requests:

```go // services/context/permission.go func CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx *Context, repo *repo_model.…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gitea ausnutzen, um möglicherweise erweiterte Privilegien zu erlangen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen oder Daten zu manipulieren und offenzulegen.