Gitea versions up to and including 1.26.2 allow Git LFS object reuse to authorize private source objects for users who have repository access but lack Code-unit access.

Affected: Go: gitea.dev

## Summary

A user with Code write access to one repository may be able to associate an existing Git LFS object from a private source repository with their target repository, even when they do not have Code access to the source repository that currently owns the LFS object.

The issue appears to be caused by the source-object authorization check using broad repository accessibility instead of requiring Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

## Impact

This issue breaks the expected authorization boundary between repository units.

A user who does not have Code access to a private source repository should not be able to reuse or associate Git LFS objects owned by that repository. However, because the source-object accessibility check accepts broad repository access, non-Code access such as Issues access may be sufficient for the LFS object to be treated as accessible.

If the reused object becomes downloadable through the attacker-controlled target repository after metadata association, this can result in cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

The target repository write authorization is still enforced. The problem is specifically in the authorization decision for whether the source LFS object is accessible and may be reused.

## Preconditions

The attacker needs:

* an authenticated Gitea account; * Code write access to a target repository; * non-Code access, such as Issues access, to a private source repository; * knowledge o…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gitea ausnutzen, um erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, sich als Benutzer auszugeben, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren und vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.