Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

## Summary

OpenClaw hook mapping transforms could be loaded via absolute paths or `..` traversal, allowing arbitrary JavaScript module loading/execution in the gateway process when an attacker can modify hooks configuration.

## Affected Versions

- Affected: >= 2.0.0-beta3 and <= 2026.2.13 - Fixed: 2026.2.14

## Details

`hooks.mappings[].transform.module` is dynamically imported and executed during webhook processing. Path resolution previously accepted absolute paths and did not enforce containment for relative paths, so a config-controlled transform could resolve outside the intended transforms directory.

## Impact

If an attacker can write the OpenClaw config (or otherwise update hooks config through authenticated configuration mechanisms), they could point a hook mapping transform at an arbitrary module on disk and execute code with the gateway process privileges.

## Reproduction (config-controlled module load)

1. Configure a hook mapping that points to a transform path that escapes the transforms directory (for example via `..` traversal). 2. Place a malicious ESM module at the resolved location that executes arbitrary code in the gateway process. 3. Trigger the hook endpoint with the correct hook token.

## Fix

Transform loading is now constrained to the OpenClaw transforms root directory:

- Root: `~/.openclaw/hooks/transforms` - `hooks.transformsDir` must be within that directory - `transform.module` must be within the selected transforms directory

Attempts t…

OpenClaw versions 2.0.0-beta3 prior to 2026.2.14 contain a path traversal vulnerability in hook transform module loading that allows arbitrary JavaScript execution. The hooks.mappings[].transform.module parameter accepts absolute paths and traversal sequences, enabling attackers with configuration write access to load and execute malicious modules with gateway process privileges.

Affected: npm: openclaw

## Summary

OpenClaw hook mapping transforms could be loaded via absolute paths or `..` traversal, allowing arbitrary JavaScript module loading/execution in the gateway process when an attacker can modify hooks configuration.

## Affected Versions

- Affected: >= 2.0.0-beta3 and <= 2026.2.13 - Fixed: 2026.2.14

## Details

`hooks.mappings[].transform.module` is dynamically imported and executed during webhook processing. Path resolution previously accepted absolute paths and did not enforce containment for relative paths, so a config-controlled transform could resolve outside the intended transforms directory.

## Impact

If an attacker can write the OpenClaw config (or otherwise update hooks config through authenticated configuration mechanisms), they could point a hook mapping transform at an arbitrary module on disk and execute code with the gateway process privileges.

## Reproduction (config-controlled module load)

1. Configure a hook mapping that points to a transform path that escapes the transforms directory (for example via `..` traversal). 2. Place a malicious ESM module at the resolved location that executes arbitrary code in the gateway process. 3. Trigger the hook endpoint with the correct hook token.

## Fix

Transform loading is now constrained to the OpenClaw transforms root directory:

- Root: `~/.openclaw/hooks/transforms` - `hooks.transformsDir` must be within that directory - `transform.module` must be within the selected transforms directory

Attempts t…

Ein Angreifer kann diese Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, sich erhöhte Berechtigungen zu verschaffen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder andere, nicht näher bezeichnete Angriffe durchzuführen.