Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: renovate

Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the renovate package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.

minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1…

Affected: npm: minimatch

### Summary

`matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior.

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### Details

The vulnerable loop is in `matchOne()` at [`src/index.ts#L960`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/index.ts#L960):

```typescript while (fr < fl) { .. if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) { .. return true } .. fr++ } ```

When a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each `**` multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k).

There is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning `false` on a non-matching input.

Measured timing with n=30 path segments:

| k (globstars) | Pattern size | Time | |---------------|--------------|----------| | 7 | 36 bytes | ~154ms | | 9 | 46 bytes | ~1.2s | |…

github.com/containerd/containerd: containerd local privilege escalation containerd: containerd has an integer overflow in User ID handling runc: runc can be tricked into creating empty files/directories on host noobaa-core: Excessive permissions of /etc could lead to escalation of privilege in the noobaa-core container go-git: argument injection via the URL field go-git: go-git clients vulnerable to DoS via maliciously crafted Git server replies golang.org/x/net/proxy: golang.org/x/net/http/httpproxy: HTTP Proxy bypass using IPv6 Zone IDs in golang.org/x/net golang.org/x/net/html: Quadratic parsing complexity in golang.org/x/net/html runc: opencontainers/selinux: container escape and denial of service due to arbitrary write gadgets and procfs write redirects github.com/moby/moby: Moby's Firewalld reload removes bridge network isolation github.com/ulikunitz/xz: github.com/ulikunitz/xz leaks memory github.com/containerd/containerd: containerd: Memory exhaustion via CRI Attach implementation goroutine leaks github.com/sigstore/fulcio: Fulcio: Denial of Service via crafted OpenID Connect (OIDC) token fulcio: Fulcio: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via unanchored regex in MetaIssuer URL validation github.com/sigstore/rekor: Rekor denial of service github.com/sigstore/rekor: Rekor Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Denial of Service due to excessive HTML parsing golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution…

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: node-minimatch, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: node-minimatch, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: node-minimatch, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-minimatch, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-minimatch, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-minimatch, Ubuntu:25.10: node-minimatch, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-minimatch

minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM SPSS ausnutzen, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, und um Dateien zu manipulieren.